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Preface
Arbitration could be studied in two different 
perspectives; what would be involved in the first perspective 
is the role that arbitration plays, among other methods, in
avoidance of dispute^ In this perspective
a study would concentrate on the technique of drafting 
concession agreements, and the priority that would be given 
to arbitration clauses among the other methods, in addition 
to the precision and quality of these clauses. In the 
second perspective one would study arbitration at work, and 
its actual dealing with procedural and substantive issues^
Here arbitration would be the mechanism of applying law toIsfacts, and here where arbitration would be expected to A
contribute to international law in so far as investment 
disputes are concerned. But for an arbitral tribunal to 
be successful in settling disputes and contributing to 
international law, a number of conditions (which will be 
referred to at a later stage of this section) must be present.
This paper proposes to deal with arbitration in both 
perspectives, in the light of the TEXACO Arbitration., Thus 
the introductory chapter will be dedicated to analysing the 
role arbitration clauses played in the concession agreements 
through their historical development. It shall start by the 
arbitration clauses in the traditional concessions, and 
analyse the attempt to provide for an international forum 
through the ICSID convention, and the declining role of 
arbitration clauses since then^to the stage where arbitration 
became a mechanism of last resort, giving the primary role
to the new technique of dispute avoidance. This technique 
has been achieved (as will be seen) in what is known as the 
modern concession, which is a contract divided into several 
sets of rights and obligations in an elaborate form^as to 
comply with the ongoing relationship between the parties.
This new model is, in other words, a set of contracts embodied 
in a concession, with each contract with a different instrument 
for conflict avoidance. The parties would execute these mini 
contracts individually, one after the other| thus any disputes 
arising from one of these mini contracts would not destabilise 
the overall relationship.
That is the role of arbitration as far as dispute 
avoidance is concerned in concession agreements. Concerning 
the second role, i.e. the actual settling of disputes, a 
combination of factors must be present for an arbitral tribunal 
to be successful in settling a dispute, and perhaps laying 
down new rules that may have a measure of significance in 
the build up of an international economic order, as well as 
declaring customary rules. These factors are : (1) full
participation in the proceedings by all the concerned before 
an arbitral tribunal formed of three arbitrators or more (2) 
a clear reference to the law(s) that should govern the proceeding 
of the tribunal and the substance of the dispute. These factors
■are vitally important for, without full participation of all 
concerned the dispute would be presented by one side.and before
. 'IIa sole arbitrator usually (as was the case in the disputes 
relating to the Libyan nationalisations). In such a case 
(no matter how hard the arbitrator tried to anticipate the 
claims and counter claims that might have been submitted by
the absent party) the argument would be one sided, A
tribunal formed of a number of arbitrators is equally
important, because there are different schools of thought 
relating to the position of individuals and their rights 
under both concession agreements and international law.
An award delivered by a sole arbitrator would, most probably 
reflect only the opinion of one school, unlike a tribunal 
with three members which could firmly establish a rule that
reflects a general acceptance, and could set precedents for
other tribunals to follow.
The lack of reference to a particular law to govern 
concession agreements has generated so many controversies 
before arbitral tribunals and elsewhere. The argument in 
short is whether in the absence of choice of law clause, the 
contract should be governed by the law of the host country 
alone, or by a combination of that and international law, 
whether there is a branch of international law to govern 
relationships emerging from concession agreements, and what 
should its position be in relation to the municipal law of 
the host country. These questions may have varying impacts 
on the outcome of international arbitrations, and they could 
be answered in different ways, which could be eliminated only 
by clear and well drafted choice of law(s) clause.
This paper will attempt to produce a critical assessment 
of the TEXACO case by comparing it with other cases, and 
illustrate the significance of the parties participati»Tg«
It shall also endeavour to analyse the relationship between 
international law and the municipal law in the light of the 
conflicting arbitrations Recent case law shall be discussed
where appropriate to show the recent developments relating 
to international arbitration and international investment. 
An assessment shall be made of the changes that have been 
brought about by these cases, and their significance to 
both foreign investors and host countries.
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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
The Role of Arbitration in the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Arbitration is the most popular mechanism for the 
settlement of commercial and investment disputes. Its 
popularity and attractiveness derives from the flexibility and 
privacy that it enjoys; on the other hand arbitration can 
be sometimes difficult, expensive, and time consuming.
More than in any other field arbitration is used for the 
settlement of investment and commercial disputes. In the field 
of investment however, the agreement is usually between a state 
and a foreign investor and so would be the arbitration most 
of the times in the event of disputes. For the purpose of 
this chapter in particular and this work in general emphasis 
shall be placed on investment disputes (oil concessions) to 
which state is a party, and for the settlement of which 
arbitration is the chosen mechanism. It must also be pointed 
out at the outset that this work will to a great extent be 
based on case law, state practice and multilateral treaty.
In the field of investment arbitration has gone through 
two stages. The first stage is the traditional concession 
where arbitration was the sole mechanism for dispute settlement 
Arbitration peaked as a dispute settlement mechanism with the 
establishment of the International Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and nationals
 :     : - . .
of other states (ICSID) as an attempt to establish the 
mechanism on an international basis and provide it with an 
international forum (i.e. "the centre"). The second stage 
is marked by a decline in arbitration primarily as a result of 
the convention's failure to attract the major capital importing 
countries. This decline continued through the seventies 
as the traditional concession became gradually replaced by 
the self-enforced modern concession.
The introductory chapter will be divided accordingly 
into three sections. The first will deal with arbitration 
clauses in the traditional concession; the second will deal 
with the ICSID convention; the third will deal with the role 
of arbitration in the modern concession.
Arbitration Clauses in the Traditional Concession
Arbitration clauses in the oil industry will be examined 
here, in the view of their close relation to our case and 
insofar as these clauses may give rise to difficulties in 
an arbitral tribunal. What will be examined here as an 
example is those arbitration clauses in traditional concession 
concluded in Iran, Iraq and Kuwait; the Libyan clauses will 
be left to be discussed in the case itself.
The oil was discovered in the Middle East as early as 
1901 in countries which were either virtually British colonies
or were in a very primitive stage from a legal, economic 
and political point of view. In view of their need for 
foreign investment and expertise these countries concluded 
a number of concession agreements with foreign companies 
for the purpose of exploring for and exploiting oil. Our 
concern for these agreements is the arbitration clauses 
incorporated therein; of a prime importance is the answer 
to the question why arbitration in particular was chosen 
as a mechanism for the settlement of potential disputes in 
preference to other means (litigation for instance)? A lot 
can be mentioned here beside the fact that reference to a 
way of settling future disputes was essential- Arbitration 
was the only alternative, given the fact that one party to 
the agreement was formally a state and, the fact that a dispute 
could not be settled by way of litigation, in view of the 
absence of any judicial system or any law sufficiently 
developed to deal with disputes as such.
It was not until the Mussdic Revolution in Iran and 
his sweeping nationalisation policies that everyone realised 
how important arbitration clauses were. Prior to the 
revolution short era, the companies and the state^ parties 
to the agreements had incorporated arbitration clauses 
dominated by generality and insignificance. The companies 
thought that there would be no political danger from the 
government ®a:çid. the ruleas, side. They were also relying on 
the influence their governments had on the region if not 
on their direct Control.
Now let us trace the development of the arbitration 
clauses in these agreements (traditional concessions) 
concluded since the beginning of the oil era until the 
last decade in the light of the changes that took place 
in that area.
In Iran prior to the year 1954 when the consortium 
agreement was entered into by the government of Iran and the 
national Iranian oil company with a consortium of American, 
British, Dutch and French companies as the result of the 
nationalisation of Iranian oil industry, there were no 
effective arbitration clauses in the agreements both with 
regard to how one party seeking arbitration could initiate 
arbitration in the event of dispute and with regard to the 
choice of law, the development of arbitration clauses went 
through five stages illustrated here by a number of agreements.
1. In the agreement concluded between the government of Persia 
and William Knox D'Arcy (1901), with regard to the place 
of arbitration Teheran was designated, but there was
nettheryanyr proviBions coMcemiirigicthètappopntihg authority 
if GheepartÿLÆaiileàltoi appolntPitsiârbftratofyi non tany. provisions 
as; I to the ichoice/ of riawl. ' n f- '
2. In the agreement between the Government of Persia and 
the Anglo-Persian oil company in 1933 provisions 
concerning the procedural law and the appointment of 
arbitrators Article 2 2 were more advanced compared to 
the 1901 agreement and a great power was given to the
umpire or the sole arbitrator with respect to the time and 
place of arbitration. Concerning the governing law 
Article 2 2 , (p) provided that "the award shall be 
based on the judicial principles contained in Article 
(3B of the Status of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice." These clauses however were frustrated in 1952 
because reference was made to the T^resident of the 
Permanent Court of justice, which Iwas! reülaced-by 
the International Court of Justice ihtl945.
In the consortium agreement in 1954 a substantial change 
was made with regard to disputes arising out of the 
agreement. Disputes related to technical or accounting yyy
questions were to be submitted to a single expert or a 
body of three experts. To this end Article 44 Para (B) 1 
provided that "if the parties did not agree whether a 
dispute fell within the meaning of technical or 
accounting dispute, then they would proceed to arbitration 
as provided in the said Article P (C).
a
As to the governing law Article 46 provided that
" this agreement shall be governed by and interpreted t
and applied in accordance with the principled of law 
common to Iran and the several nations in which the 
Other parties to this agreement are incorporated, and
' 'rjasi:in the absence of such principles, then by and in accordance 
with principles of law recognised by civilised nations 
in general, including such of those principles as may 
have been applied by international tribunals". This
Article was incorporated with a slight change in the 
agreement between NIOC and AGIP (a subsidiary of ENI, 
an Italian state corporation).
4, Prom 1958 to 1971 the agreements concluded between NIOC 
and different foreign companies in which agreements the 
governing law was "mutual goodwill and good faith."
5. Since 1971 the law of Iran has been the governing law
and provisions concerning the forming of arbitral tribunals
and appointing authorities are more developed and carefully
drafted, and this is true also for provisions concerning
2recognition of awards, enforceability and execution.
If a change can be seen from one agreement to the other 
in the Iranian oi&rsector,/teven Wrmout any sighiffcahce sonetirtes, 
it is ironic to see no change the Iraqi pattern of agreement 
both with regard to provisions concerning the governing l a w —  
which never existed in the twelve agreements concluded between 
1925 and 1968, OIT even when a clause was incorporated^it 
referred to equity and recognised general principles of law —  
as well as with regard to the appointing authority or the 
place of arbitration which was the President of the International 
Court of Justice with respect to the former and no mention 
Op Baghdad with respect to the latter.
In Kuwait, ten agreements were concluded between the 
Sheikh of Kuwait and foreign companies between 1934-1963, and 
two agreements between 1966-67 by the government of Kuwait.
__L___________________________________________________________________  ________ ___
In these agreements, two included provisions
referring to goodwill, good faith, and rules generally
recognised by civilised states as the governing law.
Article 35 of the agreement between the Emir (Sheikh) of
Kuwait and Shell Petroleum in 1961 and the agreement of 1966
between the government of Kuwait and BP, Article 7
prpi/id^in paragraph that the place and time of the 
arbitration proceding shall be determined by the referee who 
shall also determine the procedure of arbitration. Paragraph 
1 refers to the governing law as the principles common to 
Kuwait and England, in the absence of such principles then 
by the principles recognised by civilised states in general, 
including these which have been applied by international 
tribunals. In this agreement a change was made with respect 
to tax disputes which, according to paragraph J, must be 
settled in accordance with procedural provision of the 
Kuwait -Hhcome Tax Decree No. 3 of 1955 as amended by the 1967 
income tax law.
These agreements and agreements concluded between the 
government of Saudi Arabia and foreign companies and the 
rule of Abu Dabi embodied more or less the provisions 
mentioned above.
Having traced the development of arbitration clauses 
in Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, now the ICSID will be examined 
as the peak of arbitration era and how it established
to be an international forum for the settlement of 
investment disputes,- and how it works to interpret the parties* 
intentions, and how it supplements the parties* provisions with
regard to investment agreements between states and nationals 
of other contracting states.
II The lesiD Convention "International Forum"
The convention was introduced by the World Bank to 
provide an international forum to adjudicate investment 
disputes. The convention meant to provide the foreign investor 
with some certainty, eliminate his fear of changing municipal 
legal systems « and dramatic political changes that could 
undermine his undertaking, by removing the investment 
conflicts from the process of municipal law and remitting 
them to international forum (i.e. the centre created by the 
convention). Meanwhile the convention would deprive the
foreign investor . oÇ- his home country protection by diplomatic 
means when the host state is a member of the convention and
accepted to submit to the centre.
The convention has been ratified by 72 countries who were 
and may be still in desp rate need for foreign investment - 
but it should be noted that ratification in its own does not 
compel a member state to submit to the centre - on the other 
hand the convention has failed to attract the Latin American 
and other states-whe Wnsiddrette)%OhvdhtiOn m fHreat to' their 
right- Op, ccomgl^ t^  ^cgn%zoltover their nafeifral ireSourcfes 
within their countries. The Latin American view of the 
convention was stated clearly by Flex Ruiz, the Chilean 
IBRD-IMF Governor in 1964, who stated that: "the foreign 
investor under the convention, by virtue of the fact that he
9is a foreigner /is giverÿ^ the right to sue a soveriegn 
state outside its national territory dispensing with the 
courts of law. This provision is contrary to the accepted 
legal principles of our countries and defacto, would confer 
a privilege on foreign investors placing the nationals 
of the country concerned in a position of inferiority."
Nevertheless the role of the centre as an international 
forum under the convention has to be examined here. What 
remains to be examined after^is the modern concession as a 
framework for investment and the role of arbitration therein.
The role of the centre is to channel to conciliation
and arbitration but not to be involved directly in the
5settlement process. The dispute has to be a dispute between 
a contracting state and a national of another contracting 
state, so it does not entertain disputes between member 
states or between a member state and one of its nationals, 
neither does it in this regard examine disputes between 
private parties.^
For the centre to have jurisdiction the consent of the 
parties involved is essential, but once this consent has 
been established it cannot be revoked unilaterally. The 
parties consent does not have to be given at the time of 
submission to the centre, it only has to exist at that time. 
Therefore it may be given in a clause incorporated in the 
investment agreement or can be given by a separate agreement 
at the time of dispute taking place - one way of giving 
consent is by a treaty between two member states, like the
10
one between the UK and Jordan in 1979 for the promotion and
protection of investments whereby the parties agreed to refer
7disputes to the centre in question. In such a case Jordan 
is under an obligation to submit every dispute between
it and nationals of the UK with regard to investment taking 
place in Jordan,to the Centre. So much the more when a 
member state refers to the centre for the settlement of 
disputes in legislating for foreign investment and
concludes a treaty for such purpose with a capital exporting 
state.^
The centre has its own rules of procedure which must 
be applied in the event of arbitration before it. The 
arbitrators should respect the parties® choice of law to 
govern the substance, and the country’s law would apply 
in the absence of express choice to the contrary. In general 
the centre would refer the dispute to an arbitral tribunal, 
which would apply the partied agreement to the dispute and 
supplement such application by the centre*s rules if the 
agreement’s provision did not fulfil the task.
The convention does not only accomplish the investor’s 
wish to see his disputes taken away from the host country municinal 
courts, but also guarantees him the recognition and enforcement 
of awards rendered against the host state. The convention 
in this respect provides that every state member is under an
obligation to recognise and eriforce awards rendered by the
9 - ' "v.;!centre. The host state against whom the award is rendered
is required to comply with the award or otherwise it would
be subject to sanctions and may be taken to the international
11
court of justice.
Although the CSID has failed to constitute the international 
tribunal before which investment disputes could be decided 
between states and nationals of other member states, both non 
member states and private investors continue their endeavour 
to avoid disputes or reduce it to the minimum extent possible, 
or reduce the impact of disputes on their contractual relation­
ship. For such purpose they developed the so-called modern 
concession which will be examined now.
Ill Framework: "The Modern Concession"
The recent development agreements have been regarded 
as a framework for an ongoing relationship rather than a mere 
contract defining the rights and obligations of the parties.
Host governments and foreign investors have realised that 
arbitration is not always the suitable mechanism for dispute 
settlement and may prove costly for technical or accounting 
matters. Fuftherl itheÿ haveLrealisedithat the seupcetof dispute may be:
1. interpretation of the provisions of the agreement;
2. the appropriateness of the provisions themselves;
3. the state’s dissatisfaction about the lack of control 
over its natural resources.
The parties to modern concession therefore tend to build 
their relationship in a way that is capable of avoiding 
disputes to a great extent, hence it is called the self-
12
enforced contract. In such a contract the arbitration 
or stabilisation clauses are retained but just in case; 
or as a traditional formality.
The modern concession agreements elaborate on the 
rights and obligations of the parties through the durationb yof agreementamd^stage - by;/ stagee attempts r tomove rcome the 
ge:he1daJi:tye:&ndcb<hiecÿneÆfilerehoyt 0^3bheihost^ government ‘ s 
dinvets'tbmentl*:e©:desl3fandudia'wsi. 1 Tta use hi wetWknown fact that company 
law and other relevant laws are very poor in host countries 
when compared to European and North American laws on the 
subject. In addition to that the modern concession gives 
the host government a major role in investment projects, 
either by its participation or by giving it the right to 
supervision and control, in contrast with the traditional 
concession where the investor was given almost unrestricted 
rights in exploiting the natural resources, and the sole 
obligation of the investor was a royalty.
One of the stabilised frameworks is the concession
agreement between the Egyptian government, the Egyptian
General Petroleum Company (EGPC) and Chevron Oil Company 
10of Egypt. In this concession the parties made a detailed
framework for a twenty-year project - the duration of the 
concession. The concession is divided into two stages and 
the parties' relationship would change from the first stage 
to the second.
The first stage is the exploration period, where the 
company would prepare the work programme and the budget, which
13
would be reviewed by a joint committee "Exploration
Advisory Committee" and subject to EGPC approval. The committee
would be established by EGPC and the company; 3 members from
each side and the chairman would be designated by the EGPC.
nflhe. exploration period, would‘ be three years
initially but it could be extended to two additional periods
of two years each, or maybe terminated by a commercial 
11discovery. The company would carry out then all the 
operations necessary for exploration and pay for it on its 
own, but it would recover its expenses at a later stage (i.e. 
the production stage). The EGPC would be represented in 
the joint committee only for purposes of control. At this 
stage EGPC would be taking no financial burden, maybe because 
it could not afford a substantial amount of money or could 
be placing the initial risk on the investor.
The second stage starts with the establishment of a 
commercial discovery. At this stage the parties would 
establish a joint company instead of the joint committee to 
run the project on behalf of the parties during the production 
stage. The provisions incorporated to stabilise the 
relationship during this stage and to allow the company to 
recover the exploration expenses are unique. In Article 8 
of the agreement the parties agreed to divide the oil produced 
in this manner;
(a) The company would take 3C%' per annum of the crude 
oil produced and saved as a cost recovery share to 
recover what it had paid during the first stage,
(b) The remaining 70% would be shared;
I
14
(i) 80% to the EGPC, out of that quantity the
EGPC would pay to the government (in cash or in 
kind) what would be^equivalent of 10% of total 
quantity produced before the deduction of the 30% 
cost recovery,
(ii) the 20% remaining would be taken and disposed 
of by the company.
In this.kind of concession the role of arbitration has 
declined substantially, because the details in the concession 
make the likelihood of dispute very slim, What is more 
important in this concession 15 the modern concession conflict 
avoidance provisions or the avoidance of full-scale 
arbitration, some of which will be discussed now.
1. Relinquishment Clauses
One of the common clauses in the concession is a clause 
providing for periodic reduction of the concession area.
Usually a company would need a large area to explore, but it 
would not find equally attractive reserves in the whole area. 
Furthermore such a clause would speed up the exploration and 
prevent the tying up of land that could be used for 
exploitation by the government or a new investor. In the 
concession examined between the Egyptian government, the EGPC 
and Chevron, the company undertook under Article 5 to relinquish 
to the government at the end of the third year a total of 25% 
of the original. At the end of the fifth year an additional 
25% and the end of the exploration period the company wmld
15
relinquish the remainder of the original area.
2. Periodic Revision
One source of disputes is when some terms of the
agreement are no longer acceptable to one of the parties as
a consequence of changing cirumstances. Although changing
circumstances may lead to contract revision even without
an.express clause to that effect, the contemporary practice
is to include a review clause in the agreement. The review
may be periodic and may be at the instance of one of the
parties. In the agreement between the Liberian Government
12and the Liberian Iron and Steel Corporation, the parties
agreed in Article 3(B)that "in case of any profound change in
circumstances, the parties, at the request of either of them,
shall consult together for the purpose of considering such
change ....." An example of periodic revision is the clause
in the agreement between the government of Sierra Leone
and Guiseppe (an Italian company) Article 1, paragraph 3l
calls for a revision not more often than five years. The
advantage of such a clause is, that it helps the parties to
update the agreement and put both of them "on notice that a
review will take place and thus minimise the possibility of
14surprise and misunderstanding."
3. Phase in of Host Country Ownership
One Or the means of avoiding disputes is the transfer 
of shares to the host government or to a local partner. The 
OPEC established guidelines in the early seventies suggesting
16
that its members receive an initial 25 per cent participation 
in equity of local companies and that such participation 
increase by stages to an eventual 51 per cent control. The 
equity was to be paid for by the producing countries-
A 51% participation may be achieved by renegotiation
15as in Libya prior to the nationalisation. Anaconda (American
company')' and its subsidiaries had to renegotiate their
agreements with the Chilean government in 1969 and to transfer
two mines to a new company in which the Government owned 51%
of the shares. In these two cases renegotiation and the
transfer of 51% of the shares to the host government failed
to settle the disputes because in the former example the
government*s ultimate aim was an outright nationalisation,
and in the latter the Allende Government came to power in
1970. having in mind a total nationalisation, for which the
Government proposed a constitutional amendment.Nonetheless
poor countries prefer to become partners when the production
begins and the project appears to be profitable. A balanced
approach has been suggested to transfer ownership without
endangering the overall relationship and avoiding decrees
of nationalisation. This approach "would allow the local
partner, at his option, to increase his ownership up to
specified portion of the shares. If the local ownership
reaches the key percentage figure, the foreign firm has
a *put‘ option whereby it can require that the local partner
17take all the outstanding shares of the enterprise." This 
approach strikes a balance between the state which wants to 
participate and the company seeks certainty. The country
would never reach the key figure as long as it needed the
' ; , . , . , : ■ 17
company in which case the company would foe a party to a/  ^ -1
commercial project. If the country felt that it no longer 
needed the foreign company and it reached the key figure, it 
would have to buy the outstanding shares and enable the foreign 
company to withdraw in peace without loss or a need-fey 
arbitration.
Arbitration has maintained its place in the framework 
concession, but its role has declined substantially. It 
became the last resort if the parties could not modify their 
relationship mutually and satisfactorily within the framework. 
Hence the arbitration has often been limited to certain 
disputes specified in the agreement or to certain categories 
of disputes and not to all disputes arising from or in 
connection with the agreement.
The parties in the Pan-American-Iranian agreement of 1953
realised that accounting and technical disputes would be better
solved by experts than by arbitration which is usually more
effective on points of law. The parties therefore agreed that
disputes of "technical and accounting" nature would go to one
or three experts for expeditious handling. Any disputes
relating to "legal questions" that deal with interpretation
and execution of the agreement would go to a regular arbitration.
In the agreement between Chevron, EGPC and the Egyptian
Government agreed that disputes between the government and one
of the companies would be referred to the relevant Egyptian
court. Disputes between the companies would be settled in Paris
18according to the ICC rules of arbitration.
This is the role of arbitration in the settlement of 
disputes and conflict avoidance, but given the high financial 
stakes and the changing concession environment, it would be 
ideal if conflict did not arise.
18
Now the Texaco and Calasiatxc concessions will be 
assessed briefly in light of what has been discussed. The 
concessions were a model annexed to the Libyan petroleum 
law of 1955. The concessions accommodated the companies* 
and King Idris* Government * s interests quite satisfactorily. 
The said law was amended nine times and the concessions 
accordingly, but only to an extent that did not affect the 
companies* rights. The amendments were in the law clauses 
and other technical matters, but the contracts were not 
renegotiated because of the stabilisation clause which had 
guaranteed that the companies* rights could not be affected 
without the companies* consent - the provisions of the 
concessions will be discussed through the discussion of 
the arbitration.
In spite of the stabilisation clause the companies 
were prepared to give in when they saw their interests 
threatened after the overthrow of Kind Idris* Government. 
Thus they put up with the decree of nationalisation No. 66/ 
1973 which nationalised 51% of the companies* properties, 
rights and assets. The 51% were transferred to the Libyan 
National Company (LNC). The companies formed a new company 
(Amoseas) to carry out its activities as to 49% for the 
account of the companies and as to 51% for LNC.
The dispute in the arbitration at hand is not so much 
the product of a shortcoming of the contracts as a dispute 
about whether the concession as a whole could be used to 
nullify the state's decision to nationalise the companies
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and as an instrument to impose on the state an obligation to 
perform its obligations under that very contract. This 
paper proposes to discuss the arbitration and its approach to 
the problem. It will be divided to three chapters: the
first one deals with the procedural aspect of the arbitration, 
the second and the third deal with the tribunal's approach 
as to the substance.
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FOOTNOTES: Introductory Chapter s?
1. In his award of 1951 the arbitration between Petroleum 
Development (Trucial Coast) Limited and the Ruler of 
Abu Dhabi, the arbitrator - Lord Asquith of Bishopstone 
had to determine the proper law of the concession 
agreement. In the course of his considération he had 
said "if any municipal law were applicable it would 
prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi. But no such law can 
be reasonably said to exist. The Sheikh administers a
purely discretionary justice ; and it would be
fanciful to suggest that in this primitive region there 
were any settled body of legal principle." ICLQ, 1952, 
p p . 247-61.
2. Agreements referred to and examined in this section can
be found in the Annexe to 'Arbitration Clauses in the
Oil Industry, by D.A.G. Sarre, International Commercial 
Arbitration, Vol.3, pp. 63-81.
3. Article 27, Paragraph 1 of the convention; for the text 
see ILM, 1965, p. 538.
4. Quoted by W.D. Rogers, AJIL, 72, 1978, p. 4.
5. Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the convention.
6. The Secretary-General examines these requirements when 
a dispute is submitted to the Centre for registration.
7. UK Treaty seris. No. 51, 1980.
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8. Indonesia entered into a treaty with the UK in addition 
to legislating for the foreign investment and referring 
to the ICSID as a way of settling disputes.
9. Article 45, Paragraph 1.
10. For the text of the agreement see Fishres, A Collection 
of International Concessions and Related Instruments, 
(Contemporary Series), II, p.381.
11. Article 4, Paragraph 6.
12. For the agreement see Fishres, I, p.113.
13. Fishres footnote 10 p.l.
14. Smith and Wells negotiating Third World minerals 
agreements, p.139.
15. See the facts of the Texaco case, 53, ILR.
16. 59, 11^, pp.417-21.
17. Smith, supra note, 14, p.l31.
18. Article 23 of the Chevron agreement, supra note 10.
THE ARBITRATION
Factual Background
Libya gained its independence in late 1951, Idris was 
named King of the country. The only source of the national 
income was very primitive agriculture,and the agreements 
between the government and the US, and the UK giving the 
government a few million dollars; in return they were allowed 
to build military bases for their troops on the Libyan 
coast.
Libya had no hope of exploring for minerals by itself, 
Thepfinancialbdost reiploringl f oio miheralsnwouldirm into thousands of 
milliGhsno#(dollapa2 Libyas could inoh iafford^  e ux cbapfis; « of e)<perkise and 
technology ,l g llh the lights of athese ^-f abhors^ the (Libyan/(government at the 
time issued the petroleum law in 1955 in order to encourage 
foreign investment,
A great number of concession agreements were concluded 
pursuant to that,between the Libyan government (petroleum 
commission or petroleum ministry, depending on the date of 
the contract) and foreign companies. Among those were 
fourteen deeds of concession concluded between the Libyan 
government on the one hand and California Asiatic Oil 
Company and Texaco Overseas Petroleum on the other (referred 
to hereafter as the companies).
The 14 deeds of concession took the form of a model 
contract annexed to the petroleum law of 1955, so the
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provisions of the model contract are the same provisions 
incorporated in the said 14 deeds of concession,
'Clause 16 of-the deeds of concession which reads in its original 
wording thlt ' 'The goveÊtÊïBnt' Of Libyay the ’'canmission and the appropriate 
prb^ fn(#WlOauiAdri#i!ëSSwill(-:taKe^  ^all stepi#hecessary ' to ensure that the 
dm#my3eh3(^a'â#%gmSï:WïfW'eM'bÿl:Wis<mhdeSSdieai'; The rights 
02^ressly granted by this concession shall not be altered except by 
mutual consent of the parties."
These clauses were the subject matter of agreements 
between the companies and the government amending it. The
final version of Clause 16, as established by the agreement of
,20th January, 1966, which was subsequent to the decree of 
22nd November, 1955 reads as follows; "The government of 
Libya will take all steps necessary to ensure that the 
company enjoys all the rights conferred by this concession.
The contractual rights expressly created by this concession 
shall not be altered except by mutual agreement of the parties. 
Thrs:concession shall throughout the period of its validity 
be construed in accordance with the petroleum law and the 
regulation in force on the date of execution of the agreement 
of amendment by which this paragraph (2) was incorporated 
into the concession agreement. Any amendment to or repeal of 
such regulation shall not affect the contractual rights of 
the company without its consent."
Clause 28, which provided that (Paragraph 1): "If
at any time during or after the currency of this concession 
any difference or dispute shall arise between the Government
: 24 ;:|||
and the company concerning the interpretation or performance 
hereof, or any thing therein contained in connection herewith, /yyg 
or the rights and the liabilities of either such parties 
hereunder and if such parties should fail to settle such 
difference or dispute by agreement, the same shall, failing 
to settle it in any other way, be referred to two arbitrators, y: 
one of whom shall be appointed by each such party and an
umpire who shall be appointed by the arbitrators immediately 
after they are themselves appointed ....."
Paragraph 2; "The institution procedings shall take , 
place upon the receipt by one of such parties of a written 
request of arbitration."
Paragraph 3: "The party receiving the request shall,
within 90 days of such receipt, appoint its arbitrator and 
notify this appointment to the other of such party, failing
which such other party may request to the president ....  of
the international court of justice to appoint a sole 
arbitrator and the decision of the sole arbitrator as appointed 
shall be binding upon both such parties."
Paragraph 5 provided that " the sole arbitrator
shall determine the applicability of this clause and the proc­
edures to be followed in the arbitration."
Paragraph 6: "The place of arbitration shall be such
as may be agreed by such parties and in default of agreement
between them within 120 days ....  be determined by the sole
arbitrator."
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Paragraph 7: "The concession shall be governed and
interpreted in accordance with the principles of law of , 
Libya common to the principles of international law and in 
absence of such common principles then by and in accordance 
with the general principles of law including such of these as 
may have been applied by international tribunals."
In 1969 King Idris was overthrown by a revolution led 
by Colonel Gadafi. The policy of the state has been 
subsequently changed and a socialist trend prevailed. Shortly 
after that the most important sectors of the economy were 
nationalised; banking, insurance, transport.
In the field of the oil industry a programme of 
nationalisation started although a number of those 
nationalisatiohseajgpeared, (tPl% p©li-ti,eallyi n^ tivafcedTor ;■ discriminatory.
Concerning the companies, the first blow came Wiik -Wrte. 
decree of nationalisation (Law No. 60/1973) which decreed 
the nationalisation of 51% of the properties, rights and 
assets of the companies and seven other companies, but it 
did not apply to all foreign companies operating in Libya.
Article 2 of the decree provided for compensation by 
the state to be determined by a committee appointed by the 
government of Libya.
On 2nd September, 1973 the companies notified the Libyan 
government that they intended to submit to arbitration their 
dispute. The Government rejected the demand. The companies
:fl
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then availing themselves of clause 28 requested the President 
of the International Court of Justice to designate the 
sole arbitrator.
In 1974 a decree of nationalisation (Law No, 11/1974) 
decreed the nationalisation of all the properties, rights 
and assets of the companies relating to the 14 deeds of 
concession with a committee to determine compensation. The 
companies having gone the same course once more requested 
the president of the court of justice that the sole arbitrator 
hear both cases, and so it was.
The Libyan Government abstained from taking any part 
in the proceedings. It did however raise certain objections 
in a memorandum attached to a letter dated 25th July 1974, 
to the ^resident of the International Court of Justice. It 
contended that:
1, Under clause 28 of the deeds of concession there was a 
preliminary requirement that an attempt to bring about a 
friendly settlement should have been made beforehand, and 
unless such negotiation had failed the initiation of 
arbitral proceedings would be invalid.
2. It was remarked that«the arbitral proceedings were 
instituted against the Libyan Arab Republic^ while the 
deeds of concession were concluded between the Minister 
of Petroleum and the companies^^jbhat the deeds related to 
legal relations between the Minister and the companies 
while the Libyan Arab Republic, a sovereign state, was
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not party to the contract.
3. It rejected (that there was} a need for arbitration in the 
present case because there was no dispute or difference.
4. The request for arbitration was made by a party not 
qualified to bring it since the,companies had as a result 
of the nationalisation "lost their status of concession 
holders".
5, The nationalisation was an act of sovereignty which 
cannot be judged by jurisdictions other than those of 
the state concerned.
After considering the Libyan Government's objections 
the President of the International Court of Justic appointed 
Professor Dupuy as the Sole Arbitrator. The latter decided 
that the initial stage of arbitration should be devoted to 
the question whether he had jurisdiction to hear and determine
the dispute and that is the subject matter of the first 
chapter of this work, accompanied by the question of the 
procedural law.
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CHAPTER I
Jurisdiction and the Procedural Law
The Sole Arbitrator had to be particularly careful in 
establishing his jurisdiction in view of the Government's 
decision not to participate in the proceedings. The 
(government objections to the Arbitration are mentioned above, 
but for the purpose of this chapter they should be assessed 
once more. These objections understandably mean that;
1. The state sovereign right to nationalise the companies* 
properties and property rights was beyond dispute*
X'fc' entails obligation to compensate, for toinicin
purpose a committee was set up. Therefore there was no 
dispute.
2. Since the contract had been terminated by the exercise 
of that sovereign right, the arbitration clause itself 
was terminated with the contract, therefore there was 
noy^  arbitration.
3. The state was therefore not bound to arbitrate, and cannot;,-
;be subject to arbitration without its consent as a ::M
sovereign state immune from arbitration as such.
Now did the Arbitrator have jurisdiction over the dispute?! 
The Arbitrator did not fail to point out that according to q 
relevant rules adopted by international tribunals and recognises 
by legal scholars, he was the competent judge to rule on his 
jurisdiction. In the Arbitrator's own words "It is for the
   _  _
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sole Arbitrator and for him alone to render a decision on
his own jurisdiction by virtue of a traditional rule followed
by international case law and unanimously recognised by the
2writings of legal scholars.
In proceeding to establish his jurisdiction the Arbitrator 
had to deal with a number of problems in the light of the 
Government of Libya's ogjections to the Arbitration and its 
refusal to participate^T1n*S chapter is devoted to tackle such 
problems in two paragraphs, and the third one shall be 
devoted to the crucial question of the procedural law.
I.l Enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement
It is generally agreed that once a state has assented 
to submission to arbitration and then refuses to participate 
in the proceedings, arbitration can proceed unilaterally.
The prin&fp^ has been upheld by international courts and 
tribunals and all have agreed that a state' s unilateral
recessibni of an agreement to submit dispute to arbitration 
does not impair the jurisdiction of the forum in question.
This principle has been clearly stated in Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention (examined in the Introductory Chapter).
The statute of the International Court of Justice makes 
provisions for the procedure which the court should adopt 
in the event that one of the parties to a case fails to appear. \;;; 
Article 53 provides; "1. Whenever one of the parties does 
not appear before the Court or fails to defend its case the 
other party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of 
its claim. 2. The court must before doing so, satisfy
itself not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance 
with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well 
found in fact and in law-"
Similar provisions are found in the model rules in arbitral
procedure drawn by the International Law Commission, 1958, 
ArQ.de 25 of the model rules provides: "1. Whenever one
of the parties has not appeared before the tribunal ....
the other party may call upon the tribunal to decide in
favour of its case." "3.......then tribunal shall render an
award after it has satisfied itself that it has jurisdiction.
It may only decide in favour of the submissions of the party 
appearing, if it is satisfied that they are well found in 
fact and in law."
In these examples it can be seen that jurisdiction
must be found first by the forum. If so, the agreement is
enforced and the tribunal may proceed. As a matter of fact
the above examples concern agreements where the tribunal in
the case at hand had jurisdiction under a clause in a terminated
contract, but the outcome is not significantly different after
a brief examination of the severibility of the arbitration
clause^ The jurisdiction of the Sole Arbitrator
was found in Clause 28 of the fourteen deeds of concession
which had been terminated by the decree of nationalisation,
ISand here^where Sole Arbitrator Dupuy had to examine the 
severibility question. He then held that "The principle to 
which it is appropriate to refer in this matter is that of 
the autonomy or the independence of the Arbitration clause.
This principle has the consequences of permitting the
cl-: ' '■L;V
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Arbitration clause to escape the fate of the contract
 ^ ■ ' 3 \  ^ . ■ :which contains it." Indeed the modern view is to consider 
that the arbitration clause is separable from the main 
contract. "The authority of the arbitrator to decide all 
disputes would stem from the arbitration clause itself 
rather than from the agreement in which it is contained."^
Indeed the Arbitration clause should be considered 
separable in order to fulfil its function, given the parties* 
intention (stated in clause 28) to submit disputes to 
arbitration having failed to solve them^ by other amicable 
means. This was the intention not only when a dispute
emerged during the validity of the contract, but also when 
the dispute emerged in connection with the contract after 
the contract duration or termination, and in this area 
where the companies contended (i.e. the companies challenged) 
the validity of the state's act and disputed its right to 
nationalise their properties and property rights^ in addition 
to their requirement for specific performance as the proper 
remedy* The requirement for specific performance is 
certainly outside the scope of the contract and needed 
to be decided by the Arbitrator, and that's the subject 
matter of the third chapter.
1.2 The Sovereign Immunity Issue
The severibility of the arbitration clause was examined 
in the last paragraph and it has been found that the clause 
in question could survive the termination of the contract. i
-sr.-
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The question now is whether a state pleading immunity fô 
could be subject to arbitration when it has not expressly 
waived its immunity in the contract in dispute? The 
overwhelming weight of authority calls for an affirmative 
answer. Decisions of arbitral tribunals, treaty, and 
statutory provisions found in the European Community convention 
and in the law of several countries and judgments of publicOîOcourts all agreed that a state party to^arbitration agreement
is precluded from asserting its immunity in order to frustrate## 
the purpose of the agreement. Furthermore the state immunity
can be implicitly waived and that can happen by incorporation ::of an arbitration clause in a contract. In 1975 Nigeria and 
Ipitrade, a French company, entered into an agreement for 
the purchase and sale of cement. The agreement provided 
that it would be governed by Swiss law and potential disputes 
would be submitted to arbitration by the ICG, Subsequent to 
various disputes the company instituted arbitration proceeding^ 
in 1976. Nigeria refused to participate, relying on 
sovereign immunity as a defence. The tribunal not only 
dismissed the defence but also rendered an award granting 
some of the company claims. Nigeria refused to make any 
payment in accordance with the award.
Before the District Court of the District of Columbia 
the company sought to enforce the award in accordance with 
the provisions of the New York Convention on the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards of 1958 to which 
the USA, France, Switzerland and Nigeria were signatories.
__
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In addition; to contending that the award was enforcable
under the New York Convention, Ipitrade relied on the
sovereign immunity act claiming that submission to arbitration
constitutes a waiver of Nigeria's immunity under the Act.
The court held that "submission to arbitration in another
country as distinguished from the United States, constituted
an implicit waiver of immunity and that such waiver was
6binding upon and could not be revoked by Nigeria."
I.3 The Procedural Law
The parties made it the task of the Sole Arbitrator 
to determine the procedural law applicable. Clause 28(5)
provided that "....  the Sole Arbitrator, shall determine
the applicability of this clause and the Procedure to be 
followed in the Arbitration,"
In a case such as this should arbitrators follow the 
traditional approach which implies that every activity 
occurring on the territory of a state is necessarily subject 
to its jurisdiction? Therefore when the parties have not 
stipulated the procedural law^ the tribunal should apply the 
procedural law of the seat? Or should arbitrators or can 
th^follow the new approach that calls for delocalisation of 
the arbitration proceedings in the absence of the parties' 
agreement to the contrary, and the place of the arbitration 
should have no significance in relation to the proceedings on 
the grounds that, the contract itself gives the proceedings a
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binding affect and not the procedural law of the seat or 
the place simply because it provides geographically neutral 
ground for litigation.
The latter approach finds a great support in the 
French case law and among the French scholars and in the ICC 
rules. The trend towards delocalisation of arbitral proceeding;
can be seen in Article 11 of the ICC rules which after
revision in 1975 provides: "The rule governing the proceeding^
before the arbitrator shall be those resulting from these 
rules and, where these rules are silent, any rules which the 
parties (or failing them) the arbitrator may settle, and 
whether or not a reference is thereby made to a municipal 
procedural law to be applied to the arbitration," Prior 
to the revision in question the rules of the ICC were in 
favour of the traditional approach. Article 16 of the ICC 
rules of lB5519pfovidedrothât* l'thé " ruèesi.iby*'-which the 
arbitration proceedings shall be governed shall be these 
rules and, in event of no provision being made in these 
rules, those of the law of procedure chosen by the parties 
of failing such choice, those of the law of the country in 
which the arbitrator holds the proceedings." 'a:;
TimemhsiCase:\law .Isivgreatlyrelb afeyour j of the 
new phenomenon of proceedings escaping all municipal laws and 
deriving their binding effect from the transactional 
contract itself. What justifies this is the need and the 
usage of international commerce. This trend has been
illustrated recently by Libyan Maritime Company v. Gotaverken,
■ •
I;.'-:-;
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a Swedish shipyard. The dispute emerged from a set of 
substantially identical contracts whereby Gotaverken undertook 
to construct three tankers for the Libyan Maritime Company,
In accordance with the contract the dispute was submitted 
to the ICC arbitration in Paris. The tribunal composed ofÛ 
French chairman, a Norwegian and a Libyan. By a majority 
decision dated April 1978 (which the Libyan arbitrator 
refused to sign) the tribunal rendered an award in favour 
of the shipyard. The Libyan Maritime Company sought to set 
the award aside before the court of appeal of Paris for 
the reason (among others) that "it violated the French 
public order because it imposed on a foreign party an 
obligation contrary to imperative norms of its home country."
In defence the Gotaverken maintained that the contract 
had no connecting factor with France, thus argued that 
shipyard fixing Paris as the seat of arbitration did not give 
the courts of France any jurisdiction over the proceedings 
given the rule of autonomy that applies to ICC arbitration.
On rebuttal the Libyan Maritime Company argued the view 
that French law necessarily controlled the arbitration. This 
position was on three observations:
1. T h e  New York Convention's reference to the 
(subsidiary) applicability of the procedural law of 
the place of arbitration;
2. The fact that the arbitrators had applied French
rules of conflict of law; and
3. The fact that Gotaverken itself had in the Swedish
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recognition proceedings maintained that the failure 
of the Libyan arbitrator to sign the award was "in 
accordance with the French procedure, the place of 
arbitration being Paris".
For these reasons according to the Libyan Maritime Company 
the court of appeal of Paris had jurisdiction.
Gotaverken repbiedd that there was no need for arbitral 
proceedings to be attached to a national legal system; under 
the New York Convention the law of the place of arbitration 
controls the proceedings only in the absence of a specific 
agreement by the parties, and such agreement according to 
the shipyard,was present by virtue of the reference to the 
rules of the ICC, whose Article 11 authorises the detachment 
of arbitral proceedings from local law* "Thus the award was 
not French, and could not be appealed from in France.
The court refused to take jurisdiction on the principle 
that parties to international arbitral proceedings are free 
to select the legal order to which they wish to attach the 
proceedings, and this freedom extends to the exclusion of 
any national system of law.
The decision of the court constitutes a clear acceptance 
of the detachmentt phenomenon. Its underlying thesis is 
that the legal force of transnational arbitration is found 
Tn the parties' creation of a contractual institution; 
the effect of the proceedings may be left to be controlled 
by whatever legal system is requested to recognise the award.
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once it is rendered, and that system need not necessarily
8be that of the place of arbitration. Sole Arbitrator 
Dupuy^influenced by the examined trendyhad two precedents 
in terms of investment disputes and he examined them both.
The Sole Arbitrator examined the approach^prevailed 
in Sapphire v National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) arbitration^ 
where the tribunal had chosen to be governed by the procedural 
law of the O:::iuton of Vaud and submitted to the judicial 
sovereignty of Vaud. The Sole Arbitrator found this approach 
unsuitable on two grounds. The Arbitrator held that "from Q  
theoretical point of view, neither of the two parties was 
a sovereign state. Second, from a practical point of view
it is unreasonable to think that an arbitration award
_ .connected with a national legal system may perhaps be easier
to enforce ....  But this is a consideration relating to
enforcement which is not within the jurisdiction of the
Arbitrator. There is in this case, therefore, no decisive
reason either theoretical or practical, to adopt this 
,.10solution.
The Sole Arbitrator then proceeded to examine the 
second approach that had been adopted in the dispute between 
Saudi Arabia and the American Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) 
in which dispute the tribunal decided that the arbitration 
would be governed by international law on the following 
grounds. In the tribunal words: "The Arbitration is to
take place, in all cases outside Saudi Arabia. It is 
obvious therefore that the law to be applied to this institution
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is not the law of Saudi Arabia sinee the parties have 
intended from the very beginning to withdraw their dispute 
from the jurisdiction of local tribunal." And the tribunal 
continued to state that: "Considering the jurisdictional
immunity of foreign states recognised by international law ., 
the tribunal is unable to hold that the arbitral proceedings 
to which a sovereign state is party could be subject to the 
law of another country."
"It follows that the arbitration as such, can only 
be governed by international law."
Sole Arbitrator Dupuy endorsed these reasons and applied 
the approach to the case at hand adding: one must
moreover add that the procedure for the appointment of the 
Sole Arbitrator and in particular the provision, that he 
should be appointed by the President of the International 
Court of Justice strengthen the presumption that the parties 
intended that any possible Arbitration between them should be 
governed by international law."
So^for the above me'^ioned consideration the Sole 
Arbitrator chose international law to govern his Arbitration. 
Now were these consideration^ on which the approach was based, 
sound? Could such approach make Arbitration easier, more 
difficult, or ineffective? Before answering the question or
;
1making any comment a mention has to be made of the approach
adopted by Judge Lagergren acting as a Sole Arbitrator between
11the Government of Libya and the British Petroleum^ on a 
similar dispute arising out of identical contracts to those
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in thé case at hand and under the same circumstances (the 
Libyan Government refused to take part before the tribunal).
Having fixed Copenhagen as a seat of his tribunal the
Sole Arbitrator chose the Danish procedural law to govern
proceedings before the tribunal. The resort to the Danish
law (law of the seat) was based on considerations of
"effectiveness" of an award "founded on the procedural law
of a specific legal system and partaking of its nationality
referring to the "wide scope of freedom and independence
enjoyed by arbitration tribunals under Danish law" The Sole
Arbitrator added that "the attachment to a developed legal
12system is both convenient and constructive."
For the purpose of answering the proposed question, a 
comparison of the two approaches and considerations on which 
each of them was based is necessary; Judge Lagergren*s chief 
concern was the effectiveness of his award, where the Sole 
Arbitrator Dupuy's chief concern was to avoid a collision 
with state immunity, a consideration which the former
arbitrator dismissed^stating that "within the limits of 
international law, the judicial or executive authorities in 
each jurisdiction do as a matter of fact and law impose 
limitations on the sovereign immunity of other states." With 
regard to the effectiveness of the award and its enforceability 
the latter held that it was not his concern* furthermore he 
held that the effectiveness of the award should be the 
parties' concern, and the nationality and enforceability of 
the award is a matter which^usually decided by courts where
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recognition and enforcement are sought.
Both Arbitrators seem to be arguing 'to a certain
extent, ^Sovereign immunity is no longer a formidable hurdle, 
a point in favour of Judge Lagergren*s argument and against 
Dupuy*s. The courts where recognition is sought may 
recognise a detached award, a point in favour of Dupuy's 
a r g u m e n t . W h a t  is the best approach? In fact there's no 
consensus as to the procedural law and whether it should be 
detached, or should be the law of the seat. The argument 
between arbitrators reflect the theoretical one.
The current practice however seems in private disputes, 
i.e. disputes between parties subject to the private to be 
to choose an arbitration institution (e.g. ICC) and to 
submit to its rules of procedure.
disputes arising out of development agreements 
between governments and foreign companies, the practice is 
in absence of reference to institutional arbitration with its 
own rules of procedure like the centre of ICSID convention 
is to leave the choice to the arbitral tribunal^ as^^the case 
in the two Libyan cases discussed above. A recent litigation
■jL cbetween the Government of Kuwait and Amino il (an American 
company) seem to offer a new and appropriate approach. The 
Tribunal in this litigation did not waste any time discussing 
and comparing international law with the law of the seat 
(the tribunal fixed its seat in Paris, France). It adopted 
its new approach, which calls for arbitral tribunal to form 
its own rules of procedure leaving enough room for the 
mandatory rules of the seat. But having chosen a place where
the law allows a great freedom for arbitration, the referenc 
to the mandatory rules of the law of the seat would not have 
any di is tor ting effect on the tribunal's own procedures 
because the French legal system (as it is shown above) 
allows for procedural rules to be completely detached from 
any legal system including that of the seat,^ which is in 
fact giving the tribunal the chance to internationalise 
the procedural aspect of the arbitration.
ii
_________
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CHAPTER II
The Law Governing the Substance
Having internationalised the procedural aspect of his 
arbitration. Professor Dupuy proceeded to find the law governing 
substance. The Sole Arbitrator deduced that the parties had 
intended to remove their contract from the domain of private 
law and internationalise their relationship.
Because subjecting such a relationship to the so-called 
International Law of Contract may be of grave consequence, to 
the host country and to its development goals, what will be
’examined here is; first, under what conditions can a contract
be internationalised and thus be subject to international law,
and whether these conditions are sound enough to indicate the
parties* intention to internationalise their relationship.
Secondly, the content and purposes of^International Law of
Contract will be examined in the light of third world countries!]
attempts to make their political independence more meaningful
by trying to achieve an independent economy. Thirdly, the
question when did this branch of law evolve and by whoMge icdÜL
be attempted, and how it was intended to be applied to developing
countries, and the international environment in which such law 
A L L  cAjiXhioC-
was developed* ^to establish that the Arbitrator applied a set
of rules contained in a very fragile concept that cannot stand
in the path of developing countries for permanent
sovreignty and control over their natural resources which 
could be of vital importance to the nation, especially if it
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is the basic source of national income.
The first step "indications of internationalisation"
will be examined in the light of the Sole Arbitrator's findings,
II.1 Internationalised Contract
The Arbitrator lists three conditions under which the 
internationalisation of a contract can be brought about, and 
the presence of one of these conditions is said to be sufficient 
to internationalise the contract and remove it from the ambit 
of any municipal law. These conditions are:
(A) the contract may refer to the "general principles of 
law" as the applicable law;
(B) it may contain an arbitration clause;
or (C) it may be an economic development agreement.
It is true that the contract in dispute contained the first 
two conditions in addition to being an economic development 
agreement, but these conditions cannot have that effect 
without the parties' consent. Could these conditions be taken 
as the parties' consent or approval of the internationalisation 
of potential disputes? The conditions listed by the Arbitrator 
will be examined here in turn to answer the proposed question, 
in light of the historical background of granting such a 
concession and the divergent views about it as held by writers 
and arbitrators. But before doing so it must be pointed out 
that the concession had not even an implicit reference to 
international law as the governing law of the contract in 
event of dispute, and the Arbitrator did not mention that in
45
his list as a capable of justifying internationalisation
of concession agreements, because such reference is
rare if not unheard of.
Could reference to general principles of law indicate
the parties' intention of internationalising the contract?
Reference to general principle of law can be found in concession
agreements concluded four or five decades ago between foreign
companies and governments or rulers of less developed countries, .
especially in the Middle East, at a time when these countries
had hardly any legal system sufficiently developed to govern
sophisticated relationships like the oil concessions. Thus 
2 3Arbitrators and scholars held in the past and recently that 
the host state's law is "prima facie" applicable to its 
contracts; and resort to general principles of law can only 
be justified by the absence of municipal law that can govern 
the concession in dispute. In the light of all this, the 
dismissal of the law of Libya^because of reference to principles 
which, at best, are only one of the sources of international 
lav^ seems unwarranted.
Another reason for incorporating general principles of ■
law, was^^company S  fear of changes in municipal laws of the
IShost countries. Reference to such principle^meant to insulate
the companies concessions from dramatic changes in municipal
laws which may deprive them Op their contractual rights,
confiscatory measures wweln may be deemed legalAin,domestic context.A
Now the law of Libya was not changed, but a new law
nationalising the companies was introduced. In dealing with 
this very point the Sole Arbitrator in the BP case decided
■is
to ignore the law nationalising the company, because it
, i.,was directed only to the said company, and to look for rules
.of more general application in the law of Libya. The Arbitrator
held that "the tribunal considers that ....  legislative measure
solely aimed at the other party should be ignored. This 
expression must have reference to provisions of more general 
application."^ One can conclude now that, reference to 
general principles of law cannot have the effect of precluding 
the application of the Libyan law, when (as stipulated in 
the choice of law clause) the principles of such law are 
in conformity with international law.
Turning to the second condition in Dupuy's list, the 
concession combining an arbitration clause. This factor may 
be worth taking into account, when determining whether a 
particular concession is an internationalised contract. It 
may reflect the parties' intention to internationalise their 
potential dispute (i.e. submit to arbitration, an international 
forum as opposed to municipal judicial systems). But it does 
not necessarily indicate the parties* intention to have their 
contract governed by international law. Recent development 
agreements show that the arbitration clause may be coupled by 
a choice of the host state's law to govern the contract. In 
Brazil an agreement between the Brazilian National Corporation 
(PETR ORAS) and a private contractor for offshore exploration 
provided that "for the settlement of^dispute, whatsoever, the 
arbitrators shall be guided by the provisions of this contract.
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"and documents related thereto, and^aw of Brazil.„5 The
agreement of 1971 between the National Iranian Oil Company
and Mobil Oil provided for the law of Iran as the governing
1 6 law.
-,v*"
The third condition in the Arbitrator's list was that, 
the concession being an economic development agreement.
According to this criterion no concession may escape being 
governed by international law which is, a rigid approach if 
applied and may result in imposing an undue limitation on 
the parties' freedom of choice. In fact it is well accepted 
that what would nationalise or internationalise the contract 
is the parties* will, not the subject matter of their ;
agreement. The role of the arbitrator (in this context) is 
to apply law (as chosen by the.parties) to facts, and not 
to extract law from facts. At this stage it may foe useful ;
to recall that the choice of law clause in its last formulation
. ■ ■’called for the application of "the law of Libya and such rules. ' ]]& 
and principles of international law as may be relevant but 
only to the extent that such rules and principles are not 
inconsistent with and do not conflict with the laws of
7Libya." The Arbitrator found this clause applicable. But 
at a later stage he decided that reference made by the
contracts to the principles of Libyan law does not nullify 
the effect of internationalisation of the contracts Wiich has 
resulted from their nature as economic development agreements
 If international law has to be the applicable law
one way or another^ the crucial question remains "what is 
international law" that has to apply to an economic development 
agreement? This question will be dealt with in following 
section.
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II. 2 The Content of International Contract Law
This branch of international law has been under a severe
attack from scholars and lawyers, specially from those
advocating the third world's right to unfettered sovereignty
9and control over natural resources. The criticism is not 
directed so much to its being international as to its ambiguity, 
and the way some arbitral tribunals attempted to apply rigid 
rules and attributed them to International Contract Law.
In the case at hand the Arbitrator ruled that the 
principle "Pacta sunt servanda" applied to the contracts.
In doing so he further stated that "treaties are not the only
type of agreements governed by international law ....  contracts
between states and private persons can under certain conditions 
come within the ambit of particular and new branch of internat­
ional law: The International Law of Contract."
The Arbitrator claimed that the contract was subject to 
new branch of international law, but failed to draw a line 
between public international law at its strictest and 
the new branch "International Law of Contract". He simply 
applied the law of treaties (Pacta sunt servanda) to the 
contracts in dispute, which cannot be justified since the 
internationalisation of the contract "was on affirmation
of diversity and multiplicity of possible subjects and rules of 
international law,
As a matter of fact any law of contract is bound to start 
with the principle "Pacta sunt servanda" but the principle in 
its international sense^intended to have a different impact
' % 'T .
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on the State contract. Its implicit impact as it has been
argued is that, states cannot invoke their sovereignty to
abrogate an international treaty, neither can they do so to
alter a contract once it has been internationalised. This
was the approach in the Aramco case, on which the Arbitrator
relied to state that the principle "Pacta sunt servanda"
was a fundamental principle of international law applicable
torponcession agreements. In the Aramco case the tribunal
held that "By reason of its very sovereignty ....  the state
possesses the.Iggal power to grant rights which it forbids
11itself to withdraw before the end of the concession." It 
is obviously a bid to assimilate state contracts to treaties, 
and if granted it would constitute a denial of host governments* 
right nationalise. States are usually free and possess
the power to make such limitations on their sovereignty where 
the other party is a sovereign state, but in its relation with 
a foreign private party^ the state cannot be presumed to have 
limited its sovereign power when it has revoked a contract 
with a foreign investor^using that very power.
A recent arbitration between the Government of Kuwait 
12and Amin Oil came to rectify the situation and relax the 
rigidity of the approach adopted in the Aramco and Texaco 
eases. In examining the effect of the stabilisation clause (a 
clause similar to the one in the case at hand) whereby the 
Government of Kuwait undertook not to change the agreement by 
general or special, or by administrative measures, or by
any other act whatever. 13 the tribunal stated that Limit-
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ations on the state's right to nationalise are juridicially 
possible, but what that would involve would be a particularly
serious undertaking which would have to be expressly stipulated ; 
for, and be pithin the regulation governing the conclusion of 
state contracts; and it is to be expected that it should
ftcover only a relatively limited period.The tribunal went on 
to say:
"A limitation on the sovereign rights of the state is
all the less to be presumed where the concessionaire is in
any event in possession of important guaranteesregarding its
essential interests in the shape of legal right to eventual 
14compensation." The tribunal has, in effect, reversed the 
rulings in Aramco and Texaco cases which called for absolute 
immunity for concession agreements for their duration. It 
is^undue limitation on the host state sovereignty, if not 
damaging; to hold that a contract, according to the rule of 
"Pacta sunt servanda", should not be altered or abrogated by 
a sovereign act once it has been signed by a government.
Indeed the contract ran for fifty or sixty years and a state 
cannot be presumed to have signed its sovereignty off for 
such a period. The tribunal in Amin Oil held that the clause 
in question should not be interpreted "as absolutely forbidding']]]%
If
nationalisation ....  its real effect is to prevent the
nationalisation from having a confiscatory character. ,,15 Î
Arbitrator Dupuy (relying on the Aramco precedent) 
to deprive the state of Libya of its right to nationalise 
by applying International Contract Law. Another tribunal, 
adopting Dupuy * s approach and borrowing his method of 
internationalising contracts, denied to the state of Jamaica
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its right to change tax legislation applying to operating
companies within its boundaries, because the Jamaican
Government granted concessions to foreign companies prior to
the enactment of the said legislation. The case is known
16as - Revev^.Coooer v. ÔPIC. The facts may be summarised
like this: Between 1967 and 1975, Revere Copper and Brass
Inc. (Rvere) made substantial investments in a bauxite aluminium 
plant, owned and operated by Revere*s wholly-owned subsidiary. 
Revere Jamaica Alumina Ltd (RJA) in Jamaica. A 1967 agreement 
prescribed the amount of taxes and royalties which were to be 
payable to the Government by RJA and provided inter alia that 
no further taxes or financial burdens would be imposed on RJA 
and that the Agreement would remain in force for twenty-five 
years for the purpose of taxation and royalties.
In 1972 there was a change of Government in Jamaica.
Two years later the Governments attemptslto renegotiate the 
1967 Agreement, failed and a new law concerning bauxite was 
passed thereafter. The Bauxite Act increased the tax on 
bauxite payable by all companies, including RJA. RJA*s claim 
that it was not liable to pay the increased levy because of 
the 1967 Agreement was rejected by the Supreme Court of 
Jamaica. In addition the Mining law was amended in 1974 
increasing royalty on bauxite. RJA plant had been insured 
with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).
The guarantee contract provided for compensation for loss 
resulting from "expropriatory action" of a kind contrary to 
the principles of international law and including action which 
prevented the investor "from exercising effective control
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over the use or disposition of substantial portion of its 
property-" Revere contended that the increased levy and 
royalty amounted to repudiation of the 1967 Agreement^ that 
such repudiation was contrary to international law and its 
effect was to deprive Revere of its investment. OPIC argued 
that since the 1967 Agreement was governed by Jamaican law, 
it had not been broken and that, in any event, there was no 
deprivation of effective control.
In the course of determining the applicable law the 
majority held that "Although the Agreement was silent as to the 
applicable .-.law we accept Jamaican law for all ordinary purposes 
of the Agreement, but we do not consider that its applicability 
for some purposes preclude the application of principle of 
international law which govern the responsibility of states 
for injuries to aliens. We regard these principles as 
particularly applicable where the question is, as here, whether 
actions taken by a government contrary to and damaging to 
the economic interests of aliens are in conflict with under­
takings and assurance given in good faith to such aliens as
an inducement to their making the investments affected by 
17the action." The majority went on to say, "The reason for 
this is that such contracts, while not made between governments 
and therefore wholly international, are basically international 
in that they are entered into as part of a contemporary 
international process of economic development, particularly
Isin the less developed countries."
In order to substantiate this opinion, the majority 
recalled the pioneer effort (yet unsuccessful) made by the
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UK in the Anglo-Iranian Company case, to establish the 
international illegality of contract breach by a government, 
the Aramco award, and the Texaco award. Having found these 
precedents persuasive as regards the question of international­
isation of the Agreement between Revere and the Government of 
Jamaica the majority held that "in our view the actions of 
the Government ....  violate generally accepted international
law principles ....  we find on the merits for Revere and award
19accordingly."
Before making any comment on the majority findings, one
has to see what the minority thought of the case and the
applicable law. The minority did not fail to point out that the
contract which was subject to arbitration was not "a contract
between Revere and Jamaica but a contract between two American
companies entered into in the District of Columbia and
containing a provision for arbitration in the District of
Columbia of dispute arising under it. The contract and its
interpretation are thus governed by the law of the USA and
20international law."
Assuming for a moment that the tribunal was to examine 
the Government of Jamaica's actions under international law, 
é^ccording to the minority opinion, the said actions were in 
conformity with international law^ "The minority held that 
"Neither the actual amount of the Bauxite Levy nor the manner 
of its imposition is unreasonable by normal standards of tax
enactments in the international community ....  a fairly
acurate measure of the Levy would be 20% and by any standard 
this lies well within the reasonable range of the taxing powers 
of the government and is not by any standard confiscatory."
The minority further stated that "a company of the size of
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RJA which on $ 100 million normally expected to generate a 
net income of at least $ 10 million would in most European 
countries pay taxes well in excess of the Bauxite Levy on 
RJA. And to make but a few examples of Latin America the 
minority listed;
1. Guatemala's 48: tax;
2. Venezuela's 7 2% tax on net income of oil companies
and 60% on mining companies.
It was also pointed out that "what triggered the shut-down of
RJA's plant was the failure of Revere to obtain an extension
21of its labour contract ....  and not the government action,"
In the light of the minority opinion^the majority seemed 
to have seen International Contract Law as the instrument 
that should freeze the legal conditions existing at the time 
of concluding the Agreement, and hold them for its duration 
(25 years) so that they would be immune from any changes 
effected by national legislation, even if the legality of such 
legislation had been endorsed by the Supreme Court of Jamaica.
One might conclude that if international law does not
intervene to modify a contractual relationship where the host 
state is in an inferior position to its foreign partner, it 
should not be a bar in the state's path when it seeks to 
modify such a relationship to match what prevails 
contemporaries. On this particular point^Amin Oil Arbitration 
has made a valuable contribution to international law regarding
.investment agreements, in the course of its interpretation of 
Art. 9 of the Supplement Agreement of 1961, between the Company 
and the Government of Kuwaite, Art. 9 provided that "If as a
«
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result of changes in ihe terms of concessions granted hereafter,
an increase in benefits to governments in the Middle East should
come generally to be received by them, the company shall consult
with the Ruler whether in the light of all circumstances
any alteration in the terms of the agreements between the
7 pRuler and the Company would be equitable. The Tribunal
in this arbitration unlike the one in Rever Copper arbitration^
did not resist the alteration of the contract terms, specially
when such alteration had become generalized through an
extensive circle of contractual relationships. In fact the
Tribunal did not fail to point out that Art, 9 had received
a kind of application even before it was drafted, because
it was the generalization of the 50/50 sharing of
profits formula which led both to revision of the financial
terms of the concession in 1961, and at the same time giving
expression to the principle on which that revision was itself 
23founded." The underlying thesis of the Tribunal reasoning
was that ".....  a freely concluded agreement establishes as
a matter of principle an equilibrium of interests between the
parties. In spite of that^ this equilibrium will be modified
24in favour of Amother equilibrium deemed equally equitable."
Thus Art, 9 established (as the Tribunal held) "a system rests
on the implied -concept of progressive process of justice
revealing itself in the course of sufficiently general
25historical evolution ....." Indeed the Tribunal in Rever
Copper case refused to take into account the developments 
that had been brought about by concessions granted in the 
hard mineral industry in Latin America, just to ensure stability
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and security for the investor, which did put the Jamaican 
Government in an awkward position before its people. It 
is the conformity of the alteration sought with like contracts, 
that should determine the question of legality of a governmental 
action, not simply the obsolete terms of the contract that may 
render it manifestly unjoSB as a result of the change in the 
ongoing relationship.
In line with this reasoning the Tribunal in Amin Oil 
further upheld the validity of what was known as^Aba Dhabi 
formula, which had transformed the concession to a service 
contract. The Formula (which was adopted in a resolution 
by three Gulf States in Aba Dhabi and subsequently in Vienna 
by OPEC in 19 74) consists of putting up the royalty rate on 
posted prices by 20% and moving the tax rate upward to 85%.
The formula made the revenue of Amin Oil predetermined on a 
fixed basis of 2 2 cents by barrel, thus transforming the 
concession defacto into a service contract. Both parties 
did not challenge the legality of the formula, but theÿ 
differed on its application against the background of 
Art. 9 and the condition in that Article that imposed on the 
parties the duty of consultation, taking into account all 
relevant circumstances. The long^LctSB»^,» consultation and 
negotiation between the two parties lead to the nationalization 
of the Company. In upholding the validity of the said formula, 
the Tribunal noted that the widespread application of the 
formula had led to the nationalization of a number of 
companies operating in the Gulf area - Aramco among them -
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and thus nationalizing Amin Oil was perfectly legal since 
it was not a more drastic measure than what the other 
companies had received, A further examination of International 
Contract Law will be made in the third chapter on discussing 
"specific performance" as a remedy for a breach of contract 
under international law# and how one reconciles the
principle of acquired rights and the. sovereign right of the 
host state to nationalize, but it is vital at this point to 
explore the evolution of International Contract Law and the 
third world posture tn -W lb: #
II.3 Evolution and Applicability of International Contract Law
To assess the legal value of International Contract Law 
it is proper to make such assessment in a historical context; 
therefore scholars and arbitrators who bore in mind the third 
world countries' position vis a vis foreign companies when 
granting concessions# put a lot of emphasis on the fact that 
countries granting concession at the end of the colonial era or 
the beginning of independence lacked both the bargaining power and 
the legal sophistication to have those concessions governed by 
their own laws. Hence every concession was (as shown in the 
Introductory Chapter) either silent on the issue of the governing 
law or referring to good will# good faith, and general principles 
of law. Thus Lord McNair writing in the late fifties held that
"....  when the legal system of the country in which for the most
part the concession is to be performed is not sufficiently 
modernised for the purposes of regulating this type of contract 
..... the system of law most likely to be suitable forr^ulation 
  is the general principles of law recognised by civilised
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n a t i o n s , McNair's views came to confirm the position
taken earlier by Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in the
Arbitration between Petroleum Development Limited and the
27Ruler of Abu Duhabi, The underlying thesis of these 
Authorities is that what justified the resort to general 
principles of law was the lack of developed law in the 
concerned countries,which would otherwise have been applicable.
At that time and while some lawyers were seeking 
recognition for general principles of law# as the governing 
law of concession agreements, others put International Contract 
Law forward as an alternative. The then newly independent 
countries# on the other hand, were trying to make their 
political independence more meaningful by securing a matching 
economic independence# for which independence nationalisation 
was only one instrument. International Contract Law (as 
evidenced by Aramco# Texaco# and Revere Copper cases) has been 
based on concern for protection of the foreign investor in the 
third world by making his investment immune and in a superior 
position to national legislations. Indeed since the traditional 
concession did not have enough room for renegotiation and took 
the form of a charter that defined rights and obligations for 
fifty or sixty years# International Contract Law meant to 
freeze what had been accepted on concluding the agreement 
and hold them immune for their duration.
The legal value of such law has to be examined in the 
light of two notions. The first is whether a two-decade 
period is long enough for a rule to emerge and develop to be 
accepted as customary law. The second is the third world 
consistent assertion of sovereignty over natural resources and
control, and the attempt to bring about a new international 
economic order.
It is known that customary law may take a long time to
evolve, develop, take the form of state practice, and thus
become binding upon those who regard it as a law but without
any effect on those who refuse to accept such law and maintain c\such refusal. Concerning International Contract Law,A
it evolved as a matter of fact at the end of the colonial
era in which disputes used to be solved by the use of
force and coercion more than by arbitration. One of
the known examples was the blockade of Venezuelan ports by
Germany, Great Britain and Italy in 1902 to inforce a series
28of claims, several of which arose out of contracts. But the 
most blatant use of force in disputes arising out of 
nationalisation was the invasion of Egypt by British and 
French troops in the wake of the Suez Canal nationalisation 
in 1956. Since the use of force had been involved up to 
1956, and most developing countries got their independence 
in the sixties or a short period earlier, it is indeed a 
short period between the fifties and the seventies for a 
customary law to emerge and mature.
Even if such law was maintained and said toV\dVfe.matured|^^y 
Western lawyers during the post colonial era,it cannot be 
applicable to states known for their long-standing opposition 
to such law. The Sole Arbitrator dismissed the General 
Assembly resolutions, regarding the third world states 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the 
inalienable right to control over such resources, on the ground 
that such resolutions do not constitute a norm of law. The
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General Assembly's legislative power is not the major concern 
of this work but the legal value of these resolutions is.
These resolutions constitute the third world refusal of 
the so-called International Contract Law or any law other 
than their domestic laws and as any norms constituting any 
law as such.
Then what should have been the applicable law in the 
case at hand? Starting from the Arbitration clause itself 
which refers to arbitral awards as guidelines,, and the 
Arbitrator's failure to take into account the BP award which 
concerned a similar disputerons can state that the Sole 
Arbitrator did not adhere to the contract terms precisely# 
either did he come to the right conclusion. In the BP case 
the Arbitrator found that the Libyan law was applicable so 
long as it did not conflict with principles of international 
law and, only when such conflict occurs might he resort to 
general principles of law dismissing the international law as 
the applicable law. Furthermore he construed the clause as 
referring to principles of law of Libya that had general 
application, which did not conflict with principles of 
international law.M e found such applicable principles^ e.g. 
the contract was an administrative contract and the state had 
the power to modify or abrogate it for the benefit of the 
people , Sole Arbitrator Dupuy understood the choice of law 
clause as excluding any municipal law and came up with a 
different conclusion that did not manifest the right assessment 
of the interests at stake, the parties intention# and the 
development that occured in the field of investment disputes 
and the role of arbitration in such disputes.
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CHAPTER III
TheAward.and Conclusion
The Sole Arbitrator having decided the law applicable 
to the Arbitration and the contract^ proceeded to deliver his 
award. The award was what could be expected from the 
Arbitrator's examination of the case. He arrived at the 
conclusion that the deeds were binding on the\parties. The 
Libyan Government had breached its obligations arising from 
the said deeds of concession, to which breach the legal 
remedy.was specific performance (restitute in integrum ).
‘T*herefore the Government was bound to perform these contracts
1and give them full effect within a period of five months.
The award gives rise to two questions. First if the 
state under international law has a sovereign right to 
nationalise foreign properties, what is the scope of such 
right (i.e. can it be limited, if the answer is in the affirm­
ative then, to what extent and by what .means) ? 
if the state can nationalise freely as an exercise of 
sovereignty, what kind of redress is available to the foreign 
investor whose property and property rights have been nationalise 
and is the instrument by which the foreign investor acquired 
such rights (i.e. the so-called guaranteed contract) of 
significant importance in relation to the remedies available 
to the foreign investor?
Secondly,
a
The two questions are interrelated and the answer to one
6 4
of them may give a clue to the other one but they will be 
examined in two separate sections; firstly the Libyan
nationalisation as an exercise of sovereignty and secondly 
the remedies available to the companies-
III.l Nationalisation as an Exercise ofSoyerieqnty_______________________
Pursuant to the revolution and the overthrow of King 
Idress in 1969 the social and economic structure of the state
of Libya began to undergo a significant reform. A change
began to take place in the economic sector by transforming the 
state economy from free market to a directed economy)with the 
involvement of the state and under its supervision. Currently 
every important sector (banking, insurance, wholesale and 
retail of goods) of the economy is owned and run by the state.
With regard to the oil industr;^ the political leadership
of Libya realised that changing the economic patterns without
nationalising the said industry would be an absolute failure
in advance. This fear was based on the fact that the companies
not only dominated the economy^because oil was the only
resource of revenu^ but also because they dominated the global
2distribution of the product, by which domination they could 
frustrate the implementation of the state plans. In addition 
to that^ the state could not give the alien more rights and 
freedom than what it gave its citizens. So while nationalising 
the Libyan banks and insurance companies, the state could not 
give the foreign companies a free hand in the oil industry 
(generally a state is not required under international law
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to give foreigners more rights than it gives to its citizens 
under normal circumstances).
The plan was to nationalise the companies one after 
the other and not the whole industry at a single stroke.
This seemed legitimate in the Amin Oil Case where the tribunal
held that it did not see any reason "....  why a government
that was pursuing a coherent policy of nationalisation should 
not have been entitled to do so progressively. It is hardlyanecessary to stress the reasonable character of^  policy
of nationalisation operating gradually by successive stages, 
in step with the development of the necessary administrative
3and technical availabilities."
Now, was the Libyan nationalisation in conformity with 
international law? Changing the structure of the economy 
was a matter of sovereignty (exclusive internal authority) to
the exercise of which the companies and their concessions ■ ;were a threshold,'Therefore the nationalisation of the companies
Aand the termination of theirconcessions was essential. The 
.Libyan government's right to nationalise was beyond any doubt - 
even the Sole Arbitrator acknowledged that the state's right 
to nationalise is unquestionably today/ Lt results from 
international customary law and& it is the expression of 
the state's territorial sovereignty, which confers upon the 
state an exclusive competence to organise as it wishes the
■
economic structure of its territory and introduce therein any 
reforms which may seem to be desirable to it.^ The Libyan 
sovereign right however was qualified by conditions that 
Libya failed to meet, these beings; that every nationalisation must 
be for public benefit and must not be discriminatory in
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character. The Texaco nationalisation, and generally the 
policy pursued by the Libyan government in nationalising 
foreign companies operating in Libya was not coherent, but 
arbitrary which gave the nationalisation laws a discriminatory 
character, in addition to the fact that they were introduced 
in a political context (for purposes of domestic consumption) 
that gave the Sole Arbitrator and some commentators the 
conviction that it .was politically motivated and not for 
the welfare of the state or any development purposes. 
Discriminatory and politically motivated nationalisations 
are not permitted under international law,Thus the Libyan 
Government was held in breach of both international law and of 
its contractual commitments which arose from - according 
to the Arbitrator - an internationalisation contract.
Since this is the case^what are the remedies available to 
companies and is specific performanc^principle remedy or is 
there any other remedy that may accommodate the companies 
acquired rights and the other rights which conflict with 
these rights (e.g. the state's right to nationalise foreign 
companies operating within its territory) and what is the 
impact of the nationalisation being discriminatory and 
politically motivated? This is what will be dealt with in 
the following section.
III.2 Remedies Available to the Companies
In the decree nationalising the companies assets and 
rights the Government undertook to compensate the companies
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and a committee was to be set up for that purpose. The companies 
refused that and opted for arbitration.
Since compensation was rejected by the companies and the 
Arbitrator concluded that the contract was international and subject 
to both international and the Libyan laws but if they conflicted 
international law would be applicable, one has to explore the remedies 
under both systems, starting with the companies contention that specific 
performance is the normal one,
A. Specific performanoe
Insofar as the Libyan law is concerned the Arbitrator 
quoted a paragraph of Professor Mahmassani*s book (The 
General Theory of Obligations and Contract in Islamic Law) 
as evidence of Islamic law. Mahmassani wrote: "we know 
that one of the principles of Islamic law is that the right 
should revert in kind whenever there is a way to do this.
We also know that as a consequence of this principle, obligation 
must foe specifically performed as long as this is possible,"
The Arbitrator also listed a few articles of the Libyan Civil 
Code, the most important of which is Art, 206, para (1) which 
provides that "a debtor shall be compelled upon being summoned 
to do so in accordance with Art, 222 and 223 specifically to 
perform his obligation, if such performance is possible,"^
Islamic law and the Libyan Civil Code intended to apply to 
everyday transactions but not to concession agreements running 
for several decades and to a state transaction which usually
governed by administrative law under which the remedy is
ndamages. Assuming that the Civil Code was applicable, specific 
performance was impossible, considering the time between 
the nationalisation and delivering the award, in addition to 
the fact that it is politically unacceptable to a self-respecting
68
government to go back on a measure undertaken in the 
exercise of its sovereignty.
In international law the matter is subject to a great 
controversy and the views about it are in great variance.
Some scholars believe that "the government has the inherent 
power to over-ride its contractual obligations ..... this 
over-riding prevents the contract from being made the subject 
matter of specific performance."^ To hold otherwise is to 
give the state contract an absolute sanctity, an effect which 
has not prevailed in the field of treaty relations.
Insofar as international case law is concerned^the
Arbitrator referred to a;nuirteer of precedents, the most important
of which will be examined here in the light of the conflicting
views about them, to establish whether specific performance is
the principal remedy under international law. The Arbitrator
started with the often cited case, the Chrozow Factory Case
where the PCIJ decided that "the essential principle contained
in the actual notion of an illegal act .....  is that reparation
mustit as far as possible, wipe out all the illegal consequences
of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability have existed if that act had not
been committed. Restitution in kind, or if that is not possible,
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which restitution
9in kind would b e a r  " The Arbitrator admitted that the
principle had only the value of obiter dictum since restitution 
in kind was not formally requested. But (he held) that the principle 
mentioned , still.; has the value of precedent. To
support this argument the Arbitrator quoted Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice as holding in the Barcelona Traction Case that
Judicial pronouncement of one kind or another constituted
the principal method by which law can find some concrete measure
of clarification and development The statement is
right as far as it goes, but was the Arbitrator's role to apply
de lexe lata or^  de lege firenda. The Arbitrator obviously
applied the latter starting from the companij ^ s request to
have the dispute decided on principles, saw his role as
to decide whether or not the remedy restitution in kind had
existed in the case law. That must have been the case indeed
because the Arbitrator quoted a paragraph from Fatours*
11Government Guarantees Foreign Investors where damages^ it 
was stated, were.; more prevailing than specific performance. 
Professor Fatours states that J-* "It has been widely held that 
restitution in kind is the principal mode of reparation of 
material wrong, pecuniary compensation being subsidiary in 
character,applicable only when restitution is not possible 
or not claimed. On the other hand it is generally admitted 
that in practice, restitution is possible only in exceptional 
cases and that in the overwhelming majority of cases^the 
responsibility of the state is discharged by the payment of 
compensation. The latter view is supported by the case law 
of international tribunals as well as by the prevailaing
1 2 '*diplomatic practice. In fact it is only in exceptional 
cases that reparation is made through "restitution", specially 
whenever compensation is manifestly insufficient as a remedy 
like in the Temple of Preha - Vihear Case which the Arbitrator
y;.;  L ..." __
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referred tp,and where the court ordered restitution to Cambodia 
of all the objects removed from the Temple and its surroundings 
by the Thai authorities. The third case in Dupuy's list was 
Mairommatis Jerusalem Case, where the court decided that
"....  the concessions granted to M. Mairommatis ..... are
v a l i d  " CV) all these grounds the Arbitrator held that
"restitutio in integrum" is the normal sanction for non- 
performance of contractual obligations.
Before making any comment one has to make a note of 
Judge Lagregren's examination of these cases in the BP v.
Libya Arbitration, because his argument seems more thorough 
and convincing than Dupuy's. In search for a precedent in 
international case law. Judge Lagregren dismissed the Temple 
of Preah case because it related to a dispute concerning, 
territories and boundaries which bears no relevance to invest­
ment disputes and concession agreements. Nonetheless, the
restitution in kind ordered by the court in that case "....
comprised not only the Temple and the territory on which it 
was situated but specific unique works of art of religious 
significance." Indeed in this case any remedy other than restitution 
in kind would have been insufficient simply because a territory 
always represents more than the market value of the real 
estate.
Turning to the most relevant precedent, the Chorzow 
Factory case, the judge pointed out that the principle had 
only the value of obiter dictum (for the above stated reasons). 
Furthermore it cannot be considered as an authority for
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"spécifié performance" because "....  the expropriation
violated a treaty and the main object of that treaty was to
preserve a status quo by prohibiting the expropriation
13of certain property-" , The court mentioned restitution
only to establish the principle which serves to determine the
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international
law.. The third case, the Mairommatis Jerusalem case was 
dismissed by Judge Lagregren too, because the court took pains 
to point out that "this issue /the validity of the concessions/
was decided as a preliminary question only .....  and the
,decision must also be considered in the light of the related ■pleading that the concessions were invalid."
In general. Judge Lagregren argued that these cases
fcannot be taken as authorities for specific performance, for 
"the tribunals have been asked to render declaratory awards, 
and in these arbitration both parties to^contracts have 
defined the issue as being whether a particular case or conduct 
by one of the parties would or would not be permissible 
under the agreement."
Unlike Dupuy, Judge Lagregren found no authority in 
international law supporting specific performance as a remedy 
for a breach of concession agreements.
At the scholars' level, Dupuy*s approach and conclusion 
have been criticised because of their rigidity. Holding that 
restitution in kind was the principal remedy^ because it was 
awarded in cases where the taking was a violation of a treaty^ 
or where damaged would have been insufficient^seems unwarranted.
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Once-more "if thé imposition of the strict remedy restitution
might possibly be justified in some cases as between states,
it is much harder to defend such limitation on state's
freedom of action Its territory for the benefit of
15private person."
Damages is preferred to restitution in kind in this case
simply because it strikes a balance between the need
to provide certainty for foreign investments, while recognising
the host state's right to exercise control over natural
r e s o u r c e s - T h i s  solution means that a state nationalising a
foreign investment negotiated in good faith and guaranteed
would have to pay more than just and fair compensation which
is the usual remedy for nationalisation. Once mor^,damages
works effectively to accommodate conflicting interests of the
private investor on one hand^ who seeks certainty and protection
for his investment, and the government which^on the other
han(^ wants to exercise sovereign power and control over its
natural resources. To show the effectiveness of damage in this
context it must be mentioned here that the Government and the
companies settled the dispute by agreement in disregard of the
Arbitral award at hand. The Government agreed to deliver 0 152
million worth of crude oil to the companies over a fifteen 
17month period. In return the companies agreed to terminate 
the arbitration proceeding. The Arbitrator's failure to mention 
the BP award^where a different conclusion had been reached^ 
and the application of rules intended to apply to state 
treaties^^produced a rigid and too inflexible remedy for a 
dispute between a state and private investor.
il.:ï "
is
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The last point to toe made in this chapter is with
respect to state practice. The Arbitrator quoted the British
claim before the ICJ (1952) in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
Limited case that "the Government of Iran is bound, within a
period to be fixed by the court to restore the Anglo-Iranian
Company to the position as it existed prior to the said Oil
,18Nationalisation Act." This claim as evidence of state practice
should be abandoned because the British attitude has changed
since then, in addition to the fact that restitution was not
the outcome of the said dispute. In 1971 the British State
Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in the House of Commons in
the course of the BP dispute that "Insofar as the question of
nationalisation or expropriation is concerned we never said
that it is our view that countries are not entitled to
nationalise ~ of course they can nationalise — but we do
19expect prompt and adequate compensation." The conclusion 
is inescapable here, the British claim differs considerably 
from the one that prevailed in the era of the Anglo-Iranian 
Company dispute. In the English law the principle that a - 'M i
state cannot be prevented by contracts from performing function ■
essential to its existence has long been formulated in the often:|1cited case Amphirite v. The King where it was held that "the ;Crown cannot by contract hamper its freedom of action in matters
20which concern the welfare of the state." This principle does 
not suggest that the state has an inherent inability to abide 
by a contract but it stands against absolute sanctity of the 
contract where the welfare of the people is concerned.
:
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It may be absured to say that, damages or monetary
compensation is the only remedy regardless of the nature
of the taking (legal or otherwise), Such an argument would
also make a mockery of the prerequisites laid down by
international law for a taking to be legal, namely that
a taking must not be discriminatory or be politically
motivated, and be for the peoples benefit. But it is the
practice which lays down the rules in conjunction with the
case law. In that field it has not been proven that specific
performance is possible against governments, and neither has
it been proven that it has been awarded by a tribunal set
up to determine a dispute between a sovereign government
and a foreign investor* The usual remedy has been compensation
in addition to political and/or economic sanctions if the
taking was not approved of. The fact that one party has
always been a government can not be overlooked; Dr. Mitchell
(The Contract of Public Authorities) on the basis of survey
of the municipal laws of England, France and the USA^made it
clear that the remedies of specific performance and
restitution in kind are normally unavailable against
(21)governmental authority under public contracts. On
these grounds Judge Lagergan was stating the law when he 
concluded that "a rule of reason therefore dictates ... that, 
when by the exercise of sovereign power a state committed 
a fundamental breach of concession agreement by repudiating 
it through nationalisation of the enterprise and its assets 
in a manner which implied finality, the concessionaire is 
not entitled to call for specific performance by the 
government of the agreement and reinstatement of his 
contractual rights, but his sole remedy is an action for
damages,(22)
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Judge Lagergan's statement alone does not solve the 
whole problem regarding nationalisation and, the ensuing 
responsibility to compensate the foreign investor. The 
problem which arises in this respect is the amount of 
compensation and whether it should be full compensation, 
or appropriate compensation, and whether the legality of 
the taking has any impact on such amount. The subject 
matter of this question will be dealt with in the discussion 
of the second remedy available to the companies, namely the 
monetary compensation,
B . Compensation
In practice compensation has been paid for almost every
nationalisation, but there is no consensus in theory on the
amount due for legal taking. As a general rule, companies
have always demanded the full payment of future profits
they lost by abrupt repudiation of their concessions, on
the basis that restitutio in integrum would be the appropriate
remedy for losing the profits they expected and the initial 
(23)risk they took. The host governments, on the other
hand, have always asserted that*the oil or mineral subject 
matter of the concessions was the property of the state; the 
stream of earnings was unreasonably highf and the ability 
of host governments to exact taxes in recent years has made 
the calculation of future profits less certain; thus book 
value should be the s t a n d a r d . T h e s e  two conflicting 
claims represent two conflicting standards, the traditional 
one being prompt adequate and effective compensation* known 
as *full compensation®, which has been advocated by the 
capital exporting countries. The second standard is
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'appropriate compensation®, a norm that has been embodied in 
two resolutions of the General Assembly of the UN, and much 
invoked and advocated by capital importing countries and their 
lawyers. A major problem of the second standard is that it 
does not provide a definite manner of assessing such compensation 
This problem, however, has been mitigated by the Amin Oil 
award where the Tribunal introduced the concept of "legitimate 
expectations of the parties" as bnond lines to be followed 
in assessing compensation due to foreign investors.
Now in view of the sufficient discussion the traditional
(2 5)standard has received from its advocates, what will be
discussed next is the attack upon the standard itself, the 
events that lead to evolution of the new standard (i.e. 
appropriate compensation) and the argument supporting its 
binding nature.
1. The attack upon the traditional standard
Full compensation means in simple terms, the market 
value of the property and interests nationalised in the 
absence of threat of nationalisation, with interest to 
the day of payment.
Those calling for this standard have buttressed their 
claim on legal norms like 'unjust enrichment* and 'restitute 
integrum*. They claim that the host government which takes 
property that does not belong to it becomes enriched to 
the extent at least of the value of the property, if not also 
to the extent of future profits that would accrue from it.
It also has been argued (with emphasis the Chrozow Factory 
Case) that restitute in integrum (as the second best remedy)
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requires the payment of full compensation where specific 
performance is not granted or impossible to carry out.
These two theories presume that foreign investment is always 
beneficial to the host country and helps the flow of capital 
and technology from the developed countries to the less 
developed ones. In fact past experience has shown (as will 
be seen later) that foreign investment has not been beneficial 
to less developed countries all the time, for the simple 
reason that foreign investors have not been concerned so 
much about the welfare of the host countries as the
maximisation of profits. There is little doubt that those
investors would have kept their investment at home, had 
they known that it would be more profitable there.
In recent years the obligation to pay compensation was 
under a serious threat/ this was true not only with regard
to full compensation but also with compensation in general.
The serious blow came with Allende's government taking power 
in Chile and its sweeping nationalisations. The Chilean 
government did that through its constitutional instruments 
and through legal channels. The most relevant of the
introduction by the government of the concept of 'excess profits' 
which^according to the government/were to be deducted from 
the amount of compensation due to foreign companies. The 
application of such a method lead to the conclusion that, 
in some cases, the excess profits had exceeded any compensation 
otherwise due.
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The contention between Chile and the American companies
did not only undermine the full compensation claim, but also
revealed that foreign companies might be unjustly enriched
as a result of what seemed to be incentives at the first
instance (e.g. low rate of ro^ralty, low rents, low rate orLOiuCKexemption of taxation) but^developer4 time passéî^i to
create a gap between the companies* rights and obligations. 
Moreover the traditional concession ran for fifty or sixty 
years; the industry where the concession was granted would 
be bound to change, and since the companies* obligations 
were frozen, their gains would inevitably increase while 
the obligations the same.
In a speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1972
Dr. Allende outlined the conflict between his government and
(2 7)some American companies. He stated that his Government
while compensating small companies had determined that 12 
per cent profit a year was a reasonable limit and any amount 
exceeding that was excess profits - with respect to Anaconda 
Company he stated that it had made profits of 21.5 per cent 
a year over its book value between 1955 and 1970 while its 
profit in other countries had been only 3.6 per cent a year. 
The other example was Kenncott Copper Corporation which in 
the same period of time made an average of 52.8 per cent 
profit a year in Chile, In some years it made an incredible 
profits like 113 per cent in 1968 and 205 per cent in 1969, 
at the same time Kenncott was making less than 10 per cent 
a year in other c o u n t r i e s . F o r  a country like Chile 
whose foreign debt was $40,000 million, the yearly service 
of which represented 30 per cent of the mlue of Chile's
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export, full compensation would have been profound injustice
since the companies were the ones that were unjustly enriched.
That appears more blatant when it is pointed out that the
companies profit during that period was $4,000 millions,
while their initial investments were less than 30 million.
In cases like these full compensation would virtually be
a prohibition of nationalisation^since the country would
be required to pay compensation greater in amount
benefit received. In conclusion it has to be said that if
a company had received a reasonable reward for its investment
in a poor country^ and its natiœalisaticn would do the country saneAgood^compensation should not hinder such^process
In this context Chile resorted to Resolution 1803 of
the General Assembly, which required the payment of only
appropriate compensation. In doing so the Chilean Government
prescribed a detailed formula for valuation based on 1964
book value. In respect of excess profits; they were defined
as those profits exceeding: (1) the average return on the
companies world wide copper investment outside Chile,
(2) the return allowed foreign investors under international
agreements to which Chile was a party, or (3) the level
established as the base for preferential dividends payable
to Chilean Government Corporation "Codelco", under the 1967
agreements with the companies. The dispute remained unsettled
and the compensation withheld until a change of policy was
(29)brought about by a new government in 1974. The new
government paid compensation, but the precedent was set 
that compensation does not always have to be prompt and 
full. The Chilean incident illustrated, among other things, 
that a new standard for compensation was needed.
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In fact what has prevented a new norm from emerging 
is, the refusal, in principle, by capital exporting countries 
and their national of any norm calling for less than full 
compensation. And the refusal, in principle, to pay more 
than book value by capital importing countries, althoughCMcompensation has^^most of the cases, been more than book 
value and less than full. This was the case until^Amin Oil 
Arbitration declared the new norm of "appropriate compensation^ 
which will be discussed after a brief look at the previous 
practice,
2. Inconsistency of previous practice
The liability of the nationalising state to pay appropriate
compensation has been embodied, without being defined, in two
UN Resolutions: Resolution 1803 (XVIII) of 1962 on permanent
sovereignty over natural resources and, the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States 1974.^^^^ Since the adoption of
these Resolutions book value has been used by governments
and companies as the starting point from which agreement on
compensation may be reached. Book value when agreed upon as
the basis of compensation means the value of total assets minus
total liability. Companies have always used book value as
the bottom line, and their demands for compensation equivalent
of book value or in excess of it have always been in
accordance with their bargaining position as well as the
effectiveness of support they could get from their governments.
ITT refused to accept less than book value for its investment
in Chile when the Allende*s Government offered $58 million
while the company was claiming the book value, which was
( 31)said to be $150 million. The US government in turn
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reminded Allende of the seriousness with which it regarded
(32)the non-payment of just compensation. Cerro Corporation
on the other hand, had accepted $13,2 54,000 for its 70 per
cent interests in Compain Minera Andia operating in Chile 
(33)at the time. The company announced that the figure was
relatively close to book value. Anaconda transferred 51 
per cent of its shares to Cadelco, in two mines for a price 
that was calculated at 51 per cent of the company's book 
value,(34)
In the Libyan laws nationalising the companies there
was no reference to any formula for calculating compensation,
(3 5)But the Libyan Government offered book value. The
American Government expressed its dissatisfaction with the 
lack of reference to prompt and effective compensation and 
protested that "the net book value formula was far less
than fair value of the contract rights and property involved 
In the BP case the British Government demanded full 
compensation for the BP rights and assets in Libya, but full 
compensation was never paid. The dispute was settled by 
separate agreement between the Government and the individual 
companies. By an agreement in November 19 74 the Libyan 
Government agreed to pay the BP £17.4 million. This figure 
was arrived at by deducting from the sum of £62,4 million agreed 
to be due to the company, taxes, royalty and claims made by 
the Government amounting to £45 million, TEXACO was paid 
by an agreement $152 million worth of crude oil. The two 
companies never expressed whether they got the amount they 
initially wanted, and whether there was any preferential 
arrangement, like service contracts or a long term supply of
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oil. This was so because the settlement agreements were 
never published, but the companies issued statements 
announcing the settlement of the disputes by compensation 
and the end to their demand for restoration of the 
concession agreement. The Amin Oil Arbitration illustrates 
the claims and counter claims of companies and governments 
alike# and that will be the subject matter of the next step.
3, Declaration of the new standard "appropriate compensation'
In the Amin Oil case the Company claimed compensation
founded on the assumption that the concession should have
continued for its full term# without modification.(38)
is to say compensation in line with the principle restitute in
integrum. The Government of Kuwait countered by maintaining
that the only compensation the company was entitled to claim
was compensation calculated on net book value basis. The
Government backed its argument up by relying on events that
took place in the Middle East between 1971—77 in the oil
industry)as creating new rules regarding compensation. Thus
the claim must be determined by precedents resulting from a 
afseries^negotiationSand agreements about compensation. These
precedents the Government maintained "had instituted a
particular rule# of international and customary character
( 39)specific to the oil industry."
The Tribunal found both claims unsuitable for the purpose 
of calculating appropriate compensation. Having refused both 
claims# the Tribunal proceeded to spell out the general rules 
that should govern the compensation issue, and pointed out 
the facts specific to Amin Oil.
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Before starting discussions these rules and reasoning# 
one should discuss why the Tribunal refused both arguments 
and whether this has any bearing on the amount of compensation 
and compensation itself as a remedy available to foreign 
companies.
The Tribunal started by pointing out that the amount 
of compensation varies according to the legal nature of the 
governmental action in question. Hence illicit acts result 
in the liability to indemnify by paying the equivalent of 
restitute in integrum# while the matter is different for 
indemnities due for consequences of acts of expropriation 
of legitimate nationalisations. The Tribunal did so
in the course of explaining the technical difficulties that 
could be faced in determining the amount of compensation; 
a problem that has been caused by the 'controversial question 
of foreign investments# and operations involving an important 
economic complex.* Thus compensation on the basis of
restitute in integrum is# in principle# due only for illicit 
nationalisations. By drawing a line between the compensation 
due for illicit expropriation# and that due for a legitimate 
one^the Tribunal has# in effect# subscribed to the view that 
specific performance is not a remedy available against 
governments.
Turning to the government of Kuwait's contention that 
net book value compensation has acquired the force of law and 
become a binding rule on the parties by its usage in the 
Middle East between 19 71-1977^ -the Tribunal dismissed the 
argument in spite of the long use of^book.value standard# 
not only in the Middle East and the oil industry but in
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nationalisation of all kinds of natural resources elsewhere.
The Tribunal produced a number of reasons regarding both
facts and law# which undermined the book value standard 
61hgenrally as^international rule# and made it less than fair 
in the light of the circumstances surrounding the Amin Oil 
Case. As to the facts^the Tribunal held that compensation 
has always been coupled by bilateral arrangements of every 
kind (contracts of services# long term supply# etc ...). 
Therefore it could not be said that book value was the only 
compensation# for "what is certain is that in addition to 
compensation# a preferential relationship was often instituted 
or maintained between the state and the foreign entity concerned 
It would be difficult to express in figures the value in terms 
of money of these preferential arrangements/ for the 
advantages they bring depend on the structuring of the former 
concessionaire c o m p a n y .
As to reasons of law the Tribunal took into account the 
effect of the OPEC concerted policy on the relations between 
the companies and governments that reflected on the standards 
of compensation. Facts like the crucial preoccupation of the 
companies to ensure the continued supply of petroleum products 
to consumers# and the passivity of the importing states^ made 
the companies accept defacto what the OPEC members demanded.
In conclusion the Tribunal held that^while such acceptance 
was proper for the conduct of business# it lacked the 
concurrence of opinio juris. Its underlying thesis
seems to be that a practice de facto accepted should have 
the approval of the opinio juris to create a customary rule. 
Accordingly the Tribunal held that# "it would be somewhat 
rash to suggest that "such acceptance" had been inspired
b y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  The opinio juris seems a stranger ; 
to consent of this type.^^^) on the face of this finding one 
might see the ambivalent position the Tribunal put itself in# 
since it upheld ^t an earlier stage) the validity of the 
Abu Dhabi formula for the reason (among others) that the 
companies had accepted it. But the Tribunal has in single 
paragraph spelled out the relation between events that would 
be expected to create rules of law and the law as it exists:
It held that "... It can be held that the consents ... were 
not obtained by means amounting to duress# and they were ;
valid and final. But the economic pressure that lay at the 
root of them had nothing to do with law# and do not enable 
them to be regarded as components of the general formation 
of general legal rules: A j v n d X c ^ entity has the facility#
even in the case of pressure exercised through economic 
constraints# to handle its own business affairs in such a 
way as to produce concrete valid results, but it can not be 
claimed that such dealing is opposite for generating rules 
of law applicable to other cases too."(^^^
It may be right to hold that the opinio juris has an 
important role to play in the creation of new rules, but its 
absence should not deprive a practice üÇ. its legal value.
Net value was at least a quasi law# and its dismissal just 
because the companies ® acceptance was not inspired by :
judicial consideration should not deprive it of its nature as a 
practice; after all an element of nressure or duress has 
always been present in the renegotiaticns, if not in the 
concluding# of almost every economic agreement. To sum up 
the Tribunal refused the company's claim because# if restitutio
i
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in integrum is the compensation for illicit nationalisation# 
it can not be so in cases of legitimate nationalisation.
The Government argument fails in turn because it did not 
reflect the law in totus # for net book value was (as 
the Tribunal saw it) only one of many elements that should 
be taken into account in calculating appropriate compensation.
Now having seen the reasons for refusing both arguments# 
what is appropriate compensation and how should it be assessed? 
The Tribunal held that the most general formulation of rules 
was contained in the UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVll) 
Article 4 which provides that "Nationalisation, expropriation 
or requisting shall be based on grounds or reasons of public 
utility ,,. in such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate 
compensation# in accordance with the rules in force in the 
state .., and in accordance with international law."
The text which obtained a unanimous vote in the General 
Assembly codifies (as the Tribunal held) positive principles; 
what remained to be done by the Tribunal was to illustrate 
such principles and apply them to the case before it. The 
facts and circumstances taken into account in calculating 
compensation due for Amin Oil are not relevant here, but 
what is relevant is the general rules that could be applied 
to every case. The Tribunal held that appropriate compensation 
was a customary rule of an international character. In the 
making for appropriate compensation the following considerations, 
are to be taken into account as general rules, those 
considerations are: (1) enquiry into all the circumstances
relevant to the particular concrete case ^  (2) compensation 
should not be such as to render foreign investment useless#
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therefore it must be calculated on a basis such as to
warrant the upkeep of flow of investment in futureJ (3) the
legitimate expectation of the parties# this formula (the
Tribunal held) "is well devised and justifiably brings to
mind the fact that# with reference to every long term
contract ... there must necessarily be economic calculations,
and the weighing up of rights and obligations, of chances
and risks, constituting the contractual equilibrium, this
equilibrium cannot be neglected .,, when it's a question of
awarding c o m p e n s a t i o n . T h e  list provided by the
Tribunal is a general understanding of the concept of
appropriate compensation. Indeed such compensation has to
be determined on a case by case basis and by looking into
each case individually,"Therefore a tribunal as such could
not devise more than general rules to create a framework
for the calculation of compensation for legitimate
/-Snationalisation jSo much scyconsidering the fact that cases 
are not identical and vary according to the type of 
concession granted, and the interests at stake. The Tribunal 
did not fail to point out that there have been attempts on 
both sides of the argument to make the standard of 
compensation reflect the one or other group views. On the 
part of capital exporting countries attempts have been made 
by governments as well as nationals to promote the full 
compensation norm, by which norm foreign investment may 
become a burden rather than a help. The capital importing 
countries have attempted to make compensation, in some 
instances, very little or nothing. With these attempts in 
mind the Tribunal held that "compensation should not be as 
to render foreign investment useless, Therefore the
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legitimate expectation of the parties (the last point 
on the list) must be the criterion that should determine 
the appropriateness of compensation. A company investing 
a substantial amount of money expects to get a reasonable 
rate of return. The host government, on the other hand, 
expects some benefit from allowing foreign investment into 
its country, which should not be hindered by a high standard 
of compensation for nationalisation. These two considerations ## 
are always the two sides of the compensation coin*
89
CONCLUSION
Before the Arbitrator in ihis case there was a great deal of money and 
prestige at stake. The Arbitrator had to weigh the 
interest of the private companies vis a vis the public 
interest of the state of Libya as represented by the 
Government. He failed to settle the dispute, and the parties 
had to settle it by a separate agreement. The Arbitrator's 
approach has exacerbated the controversy over both the 
effectiveness of arbitration as a means of settlement of 
investment disputes, and the extent to which international 
law may intervene to safeguard the foreign investor's interest 
in a host state that wishes to control its natural resources 
for the benefit of its people by means of nationalisation.
The conclusion here is about both arbitration and the state's 
right to nationalise under international law and the consequences
To bring the conclusion in line with the whole work 
done here a concluding remark should be made about the procedural 
aspect of the arbitration, a matter on which there is no 
consensus, and which can only be remedied by an express stipulatiœ of 
the procedural law by the parties for the potential litigation 
or, better still, by a reference to institutional arbitration 
(i.e. ICSID Centre - ICC) with procedural rules available to 
provide an answeacs for procedural,:, issues or, at least to supplement 
the rules that may have been agreed upon by the parties.
Comparison of approaches has been made in the first chapter 
about the choice of the law to govern the proceedings before
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an international tribunal to which a state is a party in the 
absence of an express choice. But as a critical study of the 
approach adopted by Professor Dupuy the following remark must 
be made. The Arbitrator placed excessive emphasis on 
consideration of sovereign immunity. To hold that the 
procedural aspect should be internationalised because of reasons
of sovereign immunity is to ignore the fact that submission to 
arbitration is in itself a waiver of immunity, and there is 
no reason why such immunity should be waived at the time of 
submission^to be restored during the proceedings.
Turning to the point of nationalisation; for a state it
is an absolute right to nationalise under international law,
but this right should always be exercised for the welfare
of the people. The parties to a development agreement would
be well advised, for the stabilising of the relationship, to
make an express choice of law to govern the contract, they
can choose the municipal law of the host state, or international 
20law. International law may intervene to protect the foreign 
investor against the abuse of the state*s right to nationalise a;
or to repudiate a guaranteed contract, or when the host state*s
legal system is not sufficiently developed to govern the relation­
ship, but this does not guarantee that the state would be 
required to perform. Furthermore international law (as the 
parties* choice or as the proper law determined by an arbitral 
tribunal) does not confer absolute sanctity on the development 
agreement entered into by a state and a foreign investor, which 
in consequence means that the internationalisation of the 
agreement does not necessarily yield specific performance as
1
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the principal remedy of international law. It is the belief 
among some western lawyers that specific performance is thé 
most likely remedy under international law for a breach of 
internationalised contract by measures taken in exercise of 
sovereignty, which has led most third world countries to assert 
their municipal laws as the sole governing law of every 
development agreement they concluded with a private investor 
in recent years. Once more international law in this 
perspective should not be understood to mean Pacta sunt servanda
abecause such^principle is found in every municipal law and in 
the law of treaties, and there is no need to internationalise 
the contract just to discover the same principle again* 
[International law in this case has to be international case 
law and state practice,which the arbitrator failed to explore 
properly or misinterpreted.
Now one should state what the state of the law is after 
the Amin Oil Arbitration.
(1) The right of the state to nationalise is absolute, therefore: .investors are not entitled to call for specific performance as a 
remedy for nationalisation whatever the nature of the taking.
The sole remedy is monetary indemnification.
(2) The indemnification is to be calculated on the basis of 
restitute in integrum if nationalisation is not in complété^ 
confirmity with the conditions laid down by international law.
But if the nationalisation is lawful, only appropriate 
compensation must be paid.
92
(3) In so far as stabilisaü.on clauses are concerned, the present 
position is that, they cannot be regarded as limitation on the 
host state sovereign to nationalise or modify the contract.
Their sole effect is to prevent nationalisation from having 
a confiscatory character. Such guarantee has been provided 
generally by rules of international law, therefore these 
clauses have been, in effect, written off as unnecessary.
(4) Concession agreements can be governed by municipal law, 
international law or a combination of both; but international 
law has always to be the state practice in the field in question, 
and a rule should have the necessary consensus before^declared 
international.
...a:
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